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I am the family face;
Flesh perishes, I live on,
Projecting trait and trace
Through time to times anon,
And leaping from place to place
Over oblivion.
The years-heired feature that can
In curve and voice and eye
Despise the human span
Of durance – that is I;
The eternal thing in man,
That heeds no call to die.
– Thomas Hardy, Heredity
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In this thesis, the mobility, inequality, labor and growth trajectories in the pres-
ence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks are characterized under a general equi-
librium framework, enabling us to analyze the effects of strength of bequest mo-
tive, envy, taste for leisure, monopoly power and fiscal policies on intergener-
ational mobility and growth-inequality trade-offs. (See Figure 1 on page xii.)
This thesis provides a mechanism and plausible explanations to (i) the dif-
ferences in wealth inequality dynamics across countries and within a country
across time , (ii) the increase in mobility in developed countries with an increase
in innovation subsidies, funded by uniform output tax, and (iii) the increase in
inherited wealth inequality in countries with decreasing inheritance tax.
In the first chapter, I extend Matsuyama (1999) endogenous growth model
by introducing idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks to households with be-
quest motives in the spirit of Bossmann et al. (2007). In Matsuyama (1999),
due to the presence of fixed cost of innovation and monopoly profits, there are
different growth regimes, depending on the capital to variety ratio. Under i.i.d.
shocks, the lineage wealth evolution and cross-sectional wealth distributions for
Solow and Romer steady states, and period-2 cycles are identical, even though
as shown in Matsuyama (1999), the aggregate growth over period-2 cycles are
higher than at either of the steady states. (Under i.i.d. labor productivity shocks,
I have characterized the global mobility evolution and wealth distribution for
the Matsuyama (1999) endogenous growth model, which encompasses growing
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through chaotic intervals as discussed in Gardini et al. (2008).) With lineage-
correlated shocks, the cross-sectional inequality depends on the nature of the
fixed points.
In the second chapter, I introduce "Others regarding behavior" in the form
of "Envy" as in Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012) into the benchmark model
in Chapter 1. This is because empirical data suggests that in addition to absolute
consumption, we are concerned with the relative ranking too, which I shall refer
to as "Status Anxiety"1. This results in bequest being a luxury good. The key
findings in this chapter are: status anxiety reduces the steady state ratio of capi-
tal stock to variety of intermediate goods under both Solow and Romer regimes,
the potential growth rate of the economy, as well as the lineage mobility. More-
over, as in Chapter 1, the higher the price elasticity of the final goods sector’s
demand for each intermediate, the lower the intergenerational lineage mobility.
However, unlike in Chapter 1, with status anxiety, the inequality of inherited
wealth could be higher than the inequality of the wage income under certain
conditions.
In the third chapter, I introduce labor-leisure choice. With endogenous la-
bor, when the preference parameter for leisure increases, the intergenerational
lineage mobility increases, while cross-sectional wealth inequality increases. In
addition, the variation of wage income and leisure over the different regimes
and cycles are characterized. The comparative statics on cross-sectional ratio
1Inspired by De Botton (2008).
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of wages earned to final output are driven by the relative size of the general
equilibrium effect of the wages, the contemporaneous substitution effect of con-
sumption to leisure and the inherited wealth effect, adjusted for quality with the
contemporaneous labor productivity shock, on demand for leisure.
Finally, I examine with the distributive role of fiscal policies in Chapter 4.
Assuming a logarithmic utility function, an increase in inheritance tax decreases
cross-sectional inequality, leveling the playing field, under i.i.d. and correlated
shocks for both growth regimes and period-2 cycles, strengthening the results
from Bossmann et al. (2007), while contrasting with Becker and Tomes (1979),
Atkinson (1980) and Davies (1986). Furthermore, an increase in inheritance tax
also increases intergenerational lineage mobility under i.i.d. shocks. Besides,
the reduction of volatility of growth by fiscal policies such as the innovation sub-
sidy policy rule proposed by Aloi and Lasselle (2007), which stabilizes period-2
cycles, could level the playing field, by decreasing the persistence of inherited
wealth during the transition to the Romer steady state, if funded by a uniform
value-added tax. However, moving from period-2 cycles to the Romer steady
state with the innovation subsidies may change the cross-sectional inequality of
wealth if the idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks are correlated.
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Figure 1: Venn diagram - a general equilibrium analysis of mobility and distri-
bution with fiscal policies.
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Legend
lit Idiosyncratic labor productivity for an agent from lineage i, born
at time, t.
cit Consumption when young for an agent born at time t.
dit+1 Consumption when old for an agent born at time t.
bit Bequest inherited by an agent from lineage i, born at time, t.
β < 1 Subjective discount factor
0≤ µ < 1 Bequest motive.
wit = wt l
i
t Idiosyncratic wage income with inelastic labor.
wt Equilibrium wage rate for each unit of labor productivity.
sit Amount saved when young of an individual from lineage i, born
at time t.
yit Lifetime resource of an individual from lineage i, born at time t.
Rt+1 Equilibrium gross rate of return on capital at time t+1.
Kt−1 Unconsumed final goods in period t−1, available for production
in period t.
Lt Total labor supply at period t.
Yt Final goods production at period t.
Aˆ Total factor productivity.
[0,Nt ] Range of intermediate available at period t.
xt(z) Intermediate input of variety z.
σ > 1 Direct partial elasticity of substitution between each pair of inter-
mediate goods.
F Fixed cost of innovation.
kt = KtθσFNt Normalized capital, where θ = [1− 1σ ]1−σ .




t ] Correlation of bequests of lineage i, between generation t and
generation t+1.
CV [bit ] Cross-sectional coefficient of variation of bequests at time t.
0≤ γ < 1 Degree of envy when young.
0≤ η < 1 Degree of envy when old,η = ξγ , where 0≤ ξ < 1.
0≤ λ ,Λit < 1 Taste for leisure and fraction of time consumed as leisure when
young by agent of lineage i, born at time t, respectively.
τb Inheritance tax rate levied on the amount bequested.
τt Time dependent uniform tax rate levied on output or value-added
tax.
Tt Tax revenue collected at time t.
κ Proportion of government subsidy.
Table 1: Legend of key variables and parameters used.
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Growth and equity are central tenets in many modern societies. The pursuit of
sustained economic growth has long been enshrined as a high priority mandate
in many public offices, and a central theme in the study of macroeconomics. In
recent years, this mandate has been tampered with words such as "equitable"
and "inclusive". This is evident in the two goals which the World Bank Group1
has set in 2013, for the world to achieve by 2030: (i) "End extreme poverty by
decreasing the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to no more
than 3%", and (ii) "Promote shared prosperity by fostering the income growth of
the bottom 40% for every country". Citing Easterly (2007) and Berg et al. (2012)
respectively, the broadening of the measure of prosperity by World Bank (2013,
1World Bank (2013). Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/WB-
goals2013.pdf, on March 19, 2015.
1
pp. 23), from growth of GDP per capita to include distributional dimensions
as a proxy for shared prosperity, arises from concerns that structural inequal-
ity may hamper the magnitude and duration of growth. Most recently, Piketty
(2014) has garnered much attention and provoked discussions from academia2
to mass media3, with his book, a bestseller on Amazon4, documenting the evo-
lution of inequality over the last century. While traditional debates encompass
both the normative and positive roles of inequality on growth and political sta-
bility, Piketty (2014) draws the spotlight on the role of the difference between
returns on capital and growth rate, "r - g", in accentuating the wealth gap. On
the other hand, Acemoglu and Robinson (2014) posit that institutional factors
and their endogenous evolution are more important than the difference between
returns to capital and growth rate, using the economic and political histories
of South Africa and Sweden, and Levy and Temin (2007) do the same for the
United States, attributing the changes in income distribution over time to a set
of economic institutions including the Treaty of Detroit and the Washington
Concensus.
In this chapter, by investigating an endogenous growth model with different
2AEA 2015 Conference: A Discussion of Thomas Piketty’s "Capital in the 21st Century",
and Intergenerational Mobility over Time and Across Locations: Establishing the Facts and Ex-
plaining the Mechanisms.
Retrieved from: https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2015conference/program/preliminary.php, on Oc-
tober 27, 2014.
3For example, The Guardian (June 17, 2014). Article by Stuart Jeffries, "Piketty mania: how
an economics lecture became the hottest gig in town".
Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/jun/17/thomas-piketty-lse-capitalism-
talk, on October 27, 2014.
4Amazon Best Sellers of 2014.
Retrieved from http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/2014/books, on October 27, 2014.
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growth regimes, I hope to shed some light on the role of R and G on wealth
accumulation and inequality. Specifically, an economy can grow via capital
accumulation (neoclassical) or innovation (neo Schumpeterian) or both. The
question of interest is: will different growth regimes, determined endogenously,
lead to different cross-sectional wealth distributions and mobility for a house-
hold lineage under the general equilibrium framework? That is, I explore if
the uni-directional impact of growth on inequality could result in different dy-
namics for inequality and mobility under different growth regimes. I formalize
this idea with a model drawn from three existing literature: endogenous growth
model with fixed innovation cost to generate equilibrium with growth trajecto-
ries arising from accumulation, innovation or both regimes, stochastic idiosyn-
cratic productivity to generate an earnings distribution, and "joy-of-giving" be-
quest motive to propagate the distribution of wealth.
First, from the literature on growth, innovation induced by temporary monopoly
profits mitigates the diminishing returns to scale in neoclassical production, re-
sulting in sustainable growth. Endogenous deterministic cyclical growth, where
the magnitude of economic activity arises from agents’ optimization, may re-
sult from the innovation clustering via quality ladder growth (see Francois and
Lloyd-Ellis (2003)), or via lumpy portfolio choice between capital accumulation
or innovation due to cost of R&D financing (see Bental and Peled (1996), and
Matsuyama (1999, 2001)). In this chapter, I extend Matsuyama (1999) by in-
troducing idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks. This is because, according to
3
Nolan et al. (2014), earnings constituent the largest share of income, and hence
the driver of the income inequality, which leads us to the second strand of the
literature upon which I infer.
The evolution of inequality has been attributed to a myriad of factors rang-
ing from technological changes that result in skills premium, globalization that
leads to liberalization and enhanced mobility of the factor and product markets,
social changes such as assortative marriages and the rise of single-parent house-
holds, as well as changes in fiscal policies such as cuts in marginal tax rates5.
Using data from 30 rich countries over a period of 30 years, Nolan et al. (2014)
found that while there is a prevalent upward trend in income inequality in most
countries, cross country differences in the dynamics in terms of timing and di-
rection exist.
Second, existing literature using uninsurable idiosyncratic risks to gener-
ate heterogeneity among agents includes Quadrini (2000) and Benhabib et al.
(2011, 2014a,b), where uninsurable idiosyncratic income arising from labor
earnings and/or stochastic investment returns, with or without stochastic death
rates, are used to generate wealth distributions exhibiting power laws. A key
purpose of this strand of research is to calibrate income and wealth distributions
to match observed Pareto distributions in available datasets 6. For example,
with stochastic returns and a minimum investment threshold, Levy (2003) gen-
5IMF Staff from Fiscal Affairs Department, supervised by Sanjeev Gupta and Michael Keen
(2014) on Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality, January 23.
6See Sornette (2006) for examples of stochastic difference equations to generate Pareto dis-
tribution.
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erates a wealth distribution that converges to the empirically observed Pareto
distribution. A mechanism to generate the Pareto distribution is by a contin-
uous mixture of exponential distributions with gamma mixing weights (Bean
(2001, pp. 235)), where the exponential distributions arise from the multiplica-
tive changes in idiosyncratic investment returns of every lineage (physical or
human) and the gamma weights from the aggregation across lineages where the
arrival of death or the arrival rate of "creative destruction" is a Poisson process,
as exhibited in Benhabib et al. (2014a) and Jones and Kim (2014) respectively.
Alternatively, to generate heterogeneity: Matsuyama (2004, 2007, 2013) attains
symmetry breaking with endogenous inequality in multiple equilibrium settings
using imperfect credit markets or factor mobility; Lindquist (2004) generates
inequality over business cycles with capital skill complementarity; while Zhang
(2005) obtains a distribution of investment in human capital using bequest and
mean preserving spread.
Third, in this model, the propagation of inequality is explored using "joy-of-
giving" bequest, as well as correlated productivity shocks within a lineage. This
is similar in spirit to De Nardi (2004), where the "joy of giving" bequest mo-
tive together with a stochastic death rate reinforces the wealth concentration, as
well as Bossmann et al. (2007), who examine the role of bequests and taxation
on bequests on the distribution of wealth under neoclassical growth. In models
that use idiosyncratic stochastic capital (sometimes referred to as entrepreneur-
ship or home production) returns, or stochastic bequest motives with jumps, or
5
stochastic death rate to generate the wealth distribution from ex-ante identical
agents, the mobility or correlation across generations is pure luck, and/or all is
fair (lineage mobility is perfectly random), as with Levy (2003). This is one
end of the continuum. However, in this thesis, by using the "joy-of-giving"
bequest motive (here in Chapter 1), "status anxiety"(in Chapter 2), and endoge-
nous labor-leisure choice (in Chapter 3), fiscal policies such as inheritance taxes
and innovation subsidies (in Chapter 4), I study the direct impact of household
optimization on lineage mobility and cross-sectional inequality under different
growth regimes, in a variety of contexts. The focus of this work is thus not on
the top percentiles, but on the mobility and wealth accumulation of the masses
under different growth regimes, to explore the notion of shared prosperity and
its plausibility. Additionally, with the stationarity assumption, the dichotomy of
the cross-sectional inequality of inherited wealth versus the lineage persistence
of inherited wealth under different growth regimes provides some clues to fa-
cilitate our understanding on the taxonomy of mobility and inequality under a
stationary distribution.
Under plausible conditions, stationary distributions over period-2 growth cy-
cles of inherited wealth trajectory with general equilibrium can be established.
To the best of my knowledge, this is novel. The technical difficulty entails find-
ing the conditions for the existence, and stationarity in cross-sectional distribu-
tions, along with non-uniqueness of equilibrium all at once. I sidestep this issue
by making use of the Matsuyama (1999) model, which has proven the existence
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and non-uniqueness of equilibrium under suitable conditions, and then applying
of time series analysis, via covariance-stationarity (relaxing the strict stationary
assumption) to characterize the cross sectional distributions, using the correct
normalization so that the distributions under both the Solow (accumulation) and
Romer (innovation) regimes can be covariance-stationary and comparable.
Key findings in this chapter, under feasible stationarity conditions, are: in the
absence of capital market frictions (for example investment quantum threshold
and differentiated accessibility to investment), such that the returns on capital
faced by agents are identical, the (i) lineage mobility as well as the (ii) asymp-
totic cross-sectional inequality under both the Solow and Romer steady states
are equivalent; in addition, under i.i.d. idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks,
the (i) lineage mobility and the (ii) asymptotic cross-sectional inequality under
both the Solow and Romer steady states are also equivalent to that under period-
2 cycles. The equivalence result between the two regimes under i.i.d. shocks is
highly instructive for future research, and will be discussed in Section 1.4. With
mean reverting correlated shocks (iii) lineage mobility is lower than that with
i.i.d. shocks under the steady states, and (iv) cross-sectional wealth inequality
is higher than that with i.i.d. shocks under both steady states and period-2 cy-
cles. With lineage-correlated shocks, (v) the cross-sectional inequality depends
on the nature of the fixed points. Relative to the exogenous parameters in the
model, (vi) the higher the bequest motive, the lower the intergenerational mo-
bility and the lower the cross-sectional inequality for both i.i.d. and correlated
7
mean reverting labor productivity shocks at both steady states; (vii) the higher
the elasticity of substitution for intermediate goods in the final sector (equiva-
lently, the higher the capital share, the lower the monopoly margin of innovation
in this model), the lower the intergenerational mobility and the lower the cross
sectional inequality of bequests for i.i.d. shocks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents basic setup
of the model. Section 3 discusses the aggregate, lineage and cross-sectional be-
quest distributions for the 2 steady states, as well as the period-2 cyclical fixed
points. Section 4 examines the distribution equivalence under the 2 regimes.
Section 5 explores other comparative statics. In particular, how the distribution
of wealth and mobility changes with the bequest motive and price elasticity.
Section 6 demonstrates how correlated productivity shocks may be incorporated
into the basic theoretical framework, and the role of correlation on wealth dis-
tribution and mobility. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 The model
1.2.1 Agents’ optimization
Time is discrete. The economy consists of overlapping generations of agents
who live for 2 periods: the young period, and the old period. In each generation,
there is a continuum of measure 1 of agents. In each family i, old agent gives
birth to 1 child, keeping the population in the economy constant7. When old,
7Population changes can easily be incorporated by changing the measure of agents in each
generation to nt , instead of 1.
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an agent retires, consumes his savings, and leave a bequest to his child. When
young, an agent works inelastically to earn labor income, consumes, and saves.
Young agents within a given generation, t, are heterogenous in two aspects:
their idiosyncratic productivity, lit , and the inherited bequest b
i
t . I assume that
the labor productivity is drawn from an independent and identical distribution
on a positive support, with an expectation, E[lit ] = l¯ ≡ 1, and a finite variance,
Var[lit ] = σ2l , across agents from the same generation, and for now, independent
across time, that is, independent across generations from the same lineage. We
shall introduce correlations within the same lineage in the later section of this
chapter.
















where lit ∼ i.i.d.(1,σ2l ); cit is the consumption when young, and dit+1 is the con-
sumption when old, respectively, of an agent born at time t; bit+1 is the bequest
left by an agent born at time, t, when old, to his immediate offspring; β < 1
is the subjective discount factor; and 0 ≤ µ < 1 is the importance of bequest
motive.







t ≡ yit , (1.2)
where wit =wt l
i
t ; wt is the equilibrium wage rate for each unit of labor productiv-
ity; sit is the amount saved when young; and y
i
t is the lifetime resource of agent
9
i, born at time t.






where Rt+1 is the equilibrium gross rate of return on capital at time t+1.
The timing of the model is depicted by Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Timing of the model.









8See Appendix A.1 for derivation.
9With log utility or other homothetic preferences, the propensity to save is independent of the
lifetime income resources. This property allows us to aggregate easily the savings functions over
all agents such that the aggregate evolution of the economy does not hinge of the distribution of
wealth, while allowing the aggregate evolution of the economy to affect the wealth distribution










Using the macron (overbar accent) to represent the average, the optimal
















yt ≡ Rt+1Ω2yt . (1.11)
1.2.2 Firms’ optimization
To incorporate endogenous growth with both accumulation and innovation regimes,
the production sector is based on Matsuyama (1999). In this economy, there is a
final good (acting as the numeraire), which is produced competitively, using la-
bor and intermediate products that are converted from unconsumed final goods
in the previous period, Kt−1 into a composite via a symmetric CES function.
This composite of intermediates are combined with labor via a Cobb-Douglas










where Aˆ is the total factor productivity; xt(z) denotes the intermediate input of
variety z in period t; σ ∈ (1,∞) is the direct partial elasticity of substitution
10See Appendix A.1.
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between each pair of intermediate goods; and [0,Nt ] is the range of intermediate
available at period t.
The intermediate sector, at each period t, consist of "old" intermediates in
the range z ∈ [0,Nt−1], with N0 > 0 in period 1, that are available competitively,
and "new" intermediates in the range z ∈ [Nt−1,Nt ], that may be introduced for
exclusive sales due to a 1-period patent protection. To produce a unit of "old"
intermediate, a units of capital is needed. Hence "old" intermediates are priced
at marginal cost: pt(z)≡ pct = aRt for z ∈ [0,Nt−1], where Rt is the gross return
on capital at time t. To innovate a "new" variety, a fixed cost, F units of capital
per variety, is incurred. Subsequently, a units of capital is required to produce
each unit of "new" intermediate. With monopolistic competition, no barriers
to entry or exit, 1 period monopolistic rent, and a constant price elasticity σ ,
"new" intermediates, if introduced, will be sold at price pt(z) ≡ pmt = aσRt(σ−1)
for z ∈ [Nt−1,Nt ]. Since the final goods sector is perfectly competitive, we can



























From equations (1.13) and (1.14), the relative demand for "old" and "new" in-















Innovation is driven by the existence of 1-period monopoly profits, specifically:
pit = pmt x
m
t −Rt(axmt +F). (1.17)
Hence one-period monopoly power and free entry implies:
axmt ≤ (σ −1)F ; Nt ≥ Nt−1; [axmt − (σ −1)F ](Nt−Nt−1) = 0. (1.18)
As capital is used to produce "old" and/or "new" intermediates, the resource
constraint on capital in period t is:
Kt−1 = Nt−1axct +(Nt−Nt−1)(axmt +F). (1.19)
Combining equations (1.16), (1.18), and (1.19), the allocation of the capital


























where θ ≡ [1− 1σ ]1−σ , θ ∈ [1,e], e = 2.71828... , and θ is increasing with σ .
From equation (1.21), for innovators to break-even and innovation to occur, the
ratio of of available capital to variety, Kt−1/Nt−1 must exceed a threshold level,
θσF .












Substituting the complementary slack condition of innovation arising from the
free entry and monopoly rent, allocation of capital resource to each variety of
intermediate, as well as the dynamics of innovation, i.e. equations (1.18), (1.19),







σ if Kt−1 ≤ θσFNt−1,






σ . From equation (1.23), the economy operates in a "Solow
regime" when Kt−1/Nt−1 ≤ θσF , where no innovation occurs, and the aggre-
gate production function exhibits diminishing returns to capital as with the stan-
dard neoclassical growth model. On the other hand, the economy operates in a
"Romer regime" when innovation occurs, where the production of final goods
resembles an "AK" growth model as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).
1.3 Equilibrium steady state and dynamics
1.3.1 Derivation of equilibrium capital stock
By aggregating the inelastic labor from the young, with measure 1 of young
agents and E(lit) = 1, the labor market clearing condition is:
Lt = L =
∫ 1
0
lit di = 1. (1.24)




















Since we have measure 1 of agents in each generation, we can obtain an
equivalent expression for the aggregate savings and the aggregate capital stock














The unconsumed final goods at time t, will form the available capital stock
for production at time t + 1. Thus by integrating the savings across all young
agents, the aggregate savings in the economy is:






and the capital stock as a function of the final output of the economy can be
15
















where Ω1 ≡ β (1+µ)1+β (1+µ) and Ω3 ≡ 1+σµσ(1+µ) . That is, this economy saves a constant
fraction of its output for the next period.
From the savings process (1.30), in conjunction with with the dynamics of
innovation (1.21) and the total output (1.23), the unique equilibrium path for









σ if Kt−1 ≤ θσFNt−1,







This dynamical system can be normalized by the range of intermediate goods
to a 1-dimensional map. Define Φn (k)≡Φ(Φn−1 (k)), Φ1 (k)≡Φ(k), and
kt ≡ KtθσFNt .





σ if kt−1 ≤ kc = 1,
Gkt−1
1+θ(kt−1−1) if kt−1 ≥ kc = 1,
(1.32)
where:
Φ : R+→ R+11, kt ≡ KtθσFNt , G ≡ Ω1Ω3A, Ω1 ≡
β (1+µ)
1+β (1+µ) , Ω3 ≡ 1+σµσ(1+µ) , and
A≡ Aˆa ( aLθσF )
1
σ .
11k= 0 is excluded from the domain in the mapping kt =Φ(kt−1), as Φ
′
(0)> 1, making k= 0
a repelling fixed point and hence trivial.
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1.3.2 Steady state
The mapping kt = Φ(kt−1) with domain Φ : R+ → R+ in (1.32) has a unique
steady state where kt ≡ KtθσFNt is constant over time. Denote the fixed point
as k∗ such that k∗ = Φ(k∗) if k∗ < kc ≡ 1 and k∗∗ such that k∗∗ = Φ(k∗∗) if
k∗∗ > kc ≡ 1.
Lemma 1.1. G determines the regime under which the steady state lies, hence
the potential growth of the economy12. See Figure 1.2.
(i) If G < 1, the steady state is in the Solow regime, with kt = k∗ < kc ≡ 1.
(ii) If G > 1, the steady state is in the Romer regime, with kt = k∗∗ > kc ≡ 1.
Proof. From (1.23) (1.30), Kt = Ω1Ω3Yt = Ω1Ω3AKt−1 = GKt−1. Thus, the
growth potential of the economy is determined by the parameter G =Ω1Ω3A.
At steady state:
(i) If kt = k∗ < kc ≡ 1 (Solow regime), using (1.32) and (1.21), Nt = Nt−1 and
Kt = Kt−1. At this steady state, there is no innovation, and all goods are
supplied competitively. The economy does not grow in the long run due to
diminishing returns, as with the neoclassical stationary path. From (1.32),
k∗ = (Ω1Ω3A)σ ≡ Gσ . The condition for the existence of this stationary
path is G≡Ω1Ω3A < (kc) 1σ ≡ (1) 1σ = 1.
12See Gardini et al. (2008, pp. 543) for a discussion on border-collision bifurcation, that
results in five different regimes depending on the value of the parameter σ , when G = 1.
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(ii) If kt = k∗∗ > kc ≡ 1, from (1.32), the steady state is k = k∗∗ ≡ 1+ (G−1)θ >
kc = 1 (Romer regime). Thus, the condition for the existence of this sta-
tionary path is G ≡ Ω1Ω3A > 1. At this steady state, innovation occurs,
with K and N growing at the same rate G, along a balanced growth path.



















Figure 1.2: The unique steady state (if G < 1: Solow, and if G > 1: Romer).
1.3.3 Aggregate dynamics
For clarity and completeness, I restate 2 propositions from Matsuyama (1999)
on aggregate dynamics in this section. The focus of this thesis remains the char-
acterization of the lineage and cross-sectional wealth distributions that evolve
18
jointly with the aggregate dynamics; and how these distributions may change
with the structure of productivity shocks, bequest motives, status anxiety, elas-
tic labor, inheritance tax, or innovation subsidies.
Proposition 1.1. Matsuyama (1999, pp. 343, Proposition 1)13.
(i) If G < 1, then for any k0 ∈ R+, kt < kc for all t, and limt→∞ kt = k∗.
The economy converges to a neoclassical stationary path. (Solow regime)
(ii) If G > θ −1, then for any k0 ∈R+, there exists a t ′ such that {kt ; t ≥ t ′} ⊂
[kc,Φ(kc)] and limt→∞ kt = k∗∗.
The economy oscillates around and eventually converges to a balanced
growth path. (Romer regime)
(iii) If 1 < G < θ−1, there are period-2 cycles14; kt fluctuates forever between
Solow and Romer regimes for almost all initial conditions, that is for k0 ∈
R+\D, where D is at most countable subset of R+.
Proof. See Matsuyama (1999, pp. 344).
I shall provide a sketch of the proof by graphical analysis here.
(i) With k∗ < kc ≡ 1 (Solow regime), the slope of the mapping, kt =Φ(kt−1),
is Φ′(kt) = (1− 1σ )G(kt−1)−
1
σ > 0. As kt−1 → 0, Φ′(kt) > 1, and in the
steady state, k∗ =Gσ , Φ′(kt) = (1− 1σ )< 1 because σ > 1. Consequently,
13See Matsuyama (1999, pp. 344–345) and Gardini et al. (2008) for a discussion on other
possible trajectories. In particular, Gardini et al. (2008) proved that while chaotic regimes may
exist, only a fixed point or a cycle of period 2 are possible for stable cycles.
14Matsuyama (1999, pp. 346) suggests plausible empirical specification of parameters for
cycles to occur.
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k∗is a globally stable steady state, and for any k0 > 0, the sequence {kt}∞t=0
converges towards k∗.
(ii) k∗∗ > kc ≡ 1 (Romer regime), the slope of the mapping, kt = Φ(kt−1),
is Φ′(kt) = G[1+θ(kt−1−1)]−Gkt−1θ
[1+θ(kt−1−1)]2
= G(1−θ)
[1+θ(kt−1−1)]2 . At the steady state, by
substituting kt = k∗∗ ≡ 1+ (G−1)θ > kc = 1, we have Φ
′
(k∗∗) = (1−θ)G <
0. Since θ varies from 1 to e = 2.71828..., as σ varies from 1 to ∞, if
G > θ − 1, then −1 < Φ′(k∗∗) < 0. Then, if G > θ −1 and kc < Φ2(kc),
the steady state is globally stable. For any initial state (even in the Solow
regime), the economy will propagate to the Romer regime, remain there,
and converge with oscillation towards the steady state (balanced growth
path).
(iii) If 1 < G < θ − 1, then Φ′(k∗∗) < −1, and k∗∗ is locally unstable. It can
be shown that 1 < G < θ − 1 is equivalent to Φ2(kc) < kc < Φ(kc); thus
[Φ2(kc),Φ(kc)] represents the trapping region, which includes both the
Solow and Romer regimes, and eventually, the economy grows through
cycling back and forth between the 2 regimes. See Figure 1.3.

Proposition 1.2. Matsuyama (1999, pp. 346, Proposition 2). Let gx be the gross
growth rate of variable X. Along period-2 cyles:
(i) gN = 1 < G < G(kL)−
1




















Figure 1.3: The existence of period-2 cycles with 1 < G < θ −1.
(ii) gN = 1+θ(kH−1)> G = gK = gY in the Romer regime;
(iii) gN = gK = gY = (1+θ(kH−1)) 12 = G(kL)− 12σ > G over the cycles.
where kH =Φ(kL) = G(kL)1−
1
σ , and kL =Φ(kH) = Gk
H
1+θ(kH−1) .
Proof. As stated in Matsuyama (1999), by substituting the iterated fixed points
of the period-2 cycles: kt−2 = kH , kt−1 = kL and kt = kH into the variety ex-
pansion and total output equations, (1.21) and (1.32), where kH = Φ(kL) =
G(kL)1−
1






































Two features of this endogenous cyclical growth model are worth noting.
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First, from the perspective of the production function, the cycle length of this
model corresponds to the duration of innovation rent. In practice, depending on
the nature of the type of intellectual property (e.g. patents, industrial designs,
geographical indications or trademarks), the duration of innovation protection
varies. For example, the available term of patent protection for inventions must
be available for a minimum of 20 years from the date of filing the patent appli-
cation under the TRIPS Agreement, administered by the WTO15. On the other
hand, from the perspective of utility maximizing agents, the length of a period
in a 2-period OLG model of life-cycle savings is typically 30 years or longer16.
Hence, there is a drawback of using a 2-period life cycle preference for analyti-
cal tractability as the period length may be incongruent with the patent length or
period of monopoly rent in Matsuyama (1999)’s model. Although Matsuyama
extended his model, Matsuyama (1999), to an infinite horizon representative
agent economy in Matsuyama (2001), the infinite horizon representation is not
adopted here as I am keen to study intergenerational mobility, and due to the
finiteness of a human life, the rate of convergence matters to each realizable path
of a human life. Furthermore, modeling with infinitely-lived households implies
that parents value their children’s utility and vice-versa, with perfect 2-way al-
truism and risk-sharing, unless wedges (frictions) are introduced; for example,
15WTO - TRIPS Agreement (Article 33).
Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm#patents, on Novem-
ber 8, 2014.
16For example, in Jouvet et al. (2010), the length of a full period of their 2-period OLG model
is 40 years.
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enforcing agents to make their inter-temporal consumption versus savings de-
cision before knowing the realization of their labor productivity shocks in each
period. With the warm-glow ("joy-of-giving") bequest motive, parents value be-
quest itself (as a reduced form representation), and risk-sharing is unilateral and
imperfect. In Chapter 2, with the presence of "Status Anxiety", the "conflicts
and solidarity across generations"17, absent in the infinite horizon models, are
further highlighted using OLG models. Thus, bringing the model to data, to
match the patent length, one might have to fine-tune the number of periods each
agent lives 18. In any case, this model explains mid-term economic fluctuations,
not to the short-term business cycle volatility.
Second, growth and innovation are not synchronized19. From Proposition
1.2 part (i) and (ii), for period-2 cycles, capital accumulation and total output
growth are higher under the Solow regime compared to the Romer regime. This
is because the economy reaps the rewards of innovation only after the innovation
ends, when the market becomes competitive. Yet, to avoid fate of diminishing
returns, we need innovation of new goods, so that the economy can experience
17Phrase quoted from David de la Croix’s website.
Retrieved from http://perso.uclouvain.be/david.delacroix/olg.html, on October 22, 2015.
18Examples include: Bouzahzah et al. (2002, pp. 2096), "Agents are homogenous within
generations and live for six periods of life(i.e. from age 18 to age 78), each of them representing
10 years."; and Jouvet et al. (2010, pp. 14), "In our model economy agents live for 9 periods.
Therefore we interpret one model period to last 6 years."
19In Wälde (2005), both capital accumulation and R&D occur simultaneously, where indi-
viduals allocate resources between capital accumulation and R&D as a portfolio. Then, using
the amount of resources allocated for R&D to drive the arrival rate of a Poisson process that
determines the success rate of innovation in the economy as whole, he generates endogenous
stochastic cycles where innovation is procyclical in contrast with Matsuyama (1999) endoge-
nous deterministic cycles where innovation is countercyclical.
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indefinite growth. Thus from Proposition 1.2 part (iii), even though cycles in-
duce volatility into the economy, they augment growth over the cycle compared
to the balanced growth path.
Proposition 1.3. An economy with a higher bequest motive, µ , has a higher
growth potential.
Proof. Market clearing (equations (1.26), (1.27) and (1.29)), and the consumer








σ if Kt−1 ≤ θσFNt−1
AKt−1 if Kt−1 ≥ θσFNt−1,
along the balanced growth path, Kt = Ω1Ω3Yt = Ω1Ω3AKt−1 = GKt−1, where


























In this model, to perpetuate growth indefinitely, the innovation of new inter-
mediate goods is necessary to circumvent the diminishing returns resulting from
growth via factor accumulation à la Neoclassical models. As accumulated cap-
ital from previous period is used to produce "old" and/or "new" intermediates
in equation (1.19), an increase in the bequest motive would result in a higher
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aggregate savings rate, hence a higher rate of capital accumulation that relaxes
the resource constraint governing the innovation process.
Proposition 1.4. The normalized steady-state capital stock to variety ratio, kt ,
is increasing in the degree of bequest motive µ , in both regimes.
Proof. From equation (1.32):
when G < 1, k∗ = (Ω1Ω3A)σ ≡ Gσ ;







































The higher the bequest motive, the higher the marginal utility from savings
for each agent. Therefore the higher the aggregate wealth accumulation. Thus,
in the presence of endogenous growth, this increase in bequest motive can in-
crease the growth potential of the economy.
1.3.4 Lineage bequest evolution at Solow steady state
Moving on, from the aggregate dynamics of the economy, the lineage bequest
evolution of agents from family i, across time can be tracked. This is an ad-
vantage of using the time series analysis approach to characterize a stationary
distribution if variances of the shocks are finite. We can track or forecast the
25
intergenerational impact of a specific productivity shock through the lineage us-
ing the impulse-response function. To do so, the law of motion of bequest for
the lineage is derived, then inverted, as shown below.
Let the single asterisk superscript represents the Solow steady state. At the
Solow steady state, k∗ = Gσ < 1. Let Yt+1 = Yt ≡ Y ∗, Rt+1 = Rt ≡ R∗, and



























































At Solow steady state, the gross rate of return on capital, R∗, is the ratio of




, to the fraction of lifetime resources saved
by the young, Ω1Ω3. Using the bequest of an agent of lineage i, equation (1.7),
as well as the capital and labor shares, equations (1.26) and (1.27), we derive


























































[lit − lt ] (1.41)
The ratio of bequest to total output inherited by a young agent from lineage i at
any time t, follows a first order non-homogenous difference equation.
Following, to facilitate the discussion on the law of motion of bequests for
any lineage, I shall introduce 2 basic concepts that are used in time series anal-
ysis. (The standard notations used in time series analysis literature such as ρ
for autocorrelations, γ for autocovariances, φ for the coeffcients for AR (auto-
regressive) processes, and θ for the coefficients for MA (moving average) pro-
cesses are used here21.)
Definition 1.1. A time series process, Yt is said to be covariance-stationary or
weakly stationary if neither the mean µt , nor the autocovariances γ jt depend on
20While not necessary for the characterization of the law of motion for bequests under the
Solow steady state, normalization is needed for the characterization of the Romer steady state,
the period-2 cycles, as the total output is growing under the latter 2 trajectories. Normalization
applies along the transition to the fixed point(s) as well.
21However, to minimize confusion, E[lit ] = l¯ = 1 and σl , with the subscript l, are used to
represent the mean and standard deviation of the idiosyncratic labor productivity draws respec-
tively, as µ is used to denote the bequest motive of agents’ preference, and σ is used to denote
the final goods sector’s demand for each intermediate in the production function.
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the date t22. That is,





] = γ j for all t and any j.
(1.42)
If a process is covariance-stationary, the covariance between Yt and Yt− j is
dependent only on the length of time separating the observations, and is inde-
pendent of t, the date of the observation. Furthermore,
γ j = γ− j for all integers j. (1.43)
Definition 1.2. A time series process, Yt is said to be strictly stationary if, for
any values of j1, j2, ..... jn, the joint density of (Yt ,Yt+ j1,Yt+ j2, ....,Yt+ jn) depends
only on the intervals separating the dates ( j1, j2, ..... jn) and not the date itself
(t)23.
If a process is strictly stationary with finite second moments, then it must
be covariance-stationary. However, a covariance-stationary process need not be
strictly stationary24, e.g. when higher moments such as E(Y 3t ) are a function of
time. In addition, there are strictly stationary processes that are not covariance
stationary. For example, a sequence of i.i.d. Cauchy random variables, while












22See Hamilton (1994, pp. 45).
23See Hamilton (1994, pp. 46).
24See Wei (2006, pp. 9 ) for an instructive example, that resembles the trajectory of a period-2












into equation (1.40), we get a first order homogenous difference equation for
z∗it+1 . That is,
z∗it+1−φ∗1 z∗it = [lit − lt ]≡ uit+1 ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2l ). (1.45)
Following Conlisk (1974) and Bossmann et al. (2007), I use the correlation of
parent-child inherited wealth within a lineage as a measure of the degree of
social immobility, and coefficient of variation as a measure of cross-sectional
inequality respectively.
Proposition 1.5. Since |φ∗1 | ≡
∣∣∣∣ (1− 1σ )βµΩ1Ω3[1+β (1+µ)]
∣∣∣∣< 1, z∗it+1 is a covariance-stationary
AR(1) process25.
(i) The expected bequest inherited by a young agent of lineage i, as a ratio of
















(ii) The variance of bequest inherited by a young agent of lineage i, as a ratio




















(iii) The intergenerational mobility can be measured by the covariance or the
correlation coefficient, to gauge the extent of intergenerational transmis-






t−2, ... is identical to the distribution of z
∗i
t+1 given
z∗it . That is, the AR(1) process is a Markov process.
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∀k ≥ 1. (1.51)
Proof. See Hamilton (1994, Appendix 3.A. pp. 69) for conditions for covariance-





t+1, where L is the lag operator, and for z
∗i
t+1 to be stationary, the
root of the characteristic equation, (1−φ∗1 L)= 0, must lie outside the unit circle,


















26Although Hamilton (1994, Appendix 3.A. pp. 69) proves the convergence for the MA(∞)
process, an AR(1) process can be viewed as an MA(∞) process (Hamilton (1994, pp. 53)).
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The moments for this AR(1) process can be calculated from the difference
equation (1.44) directly, assuming covariance stationarity (Hamilton (1994, pp.
53–56)), or by applying the generalized autocovariance generating function for
autoregressive moving average, ARMA, processes, together with some alge-
braic manipulations (Hamilton (1994, pp. 61–63)). That is, for the AR(1) pro-















γ j = φ∗ j1 γ0 =
φ∗ jσ2l
1−φ∗21







The general condition for covariance stationarity for an AR(1) process, |φ∗1 |<
1 implies that Rt+1βµGt+1[1+β (1+µ)] < 1 in this model, where Gt+1 denotes the gross
growth rate of final output. While shown on the preceding proof that this
condition is not binding in the current model, it is worth discussing what this
covariance-stationarity condition means from the point of view of agents’ opti-
mization and the production structure, both under the Solow regime and Romer
regime. From equation (1.7) the coefficient of the AR(1) corresponds to the
fraction of lifetime resource (the agent gets from wages and from inheritance
when young) that is bequested to the next generation. Thus, for a covariance-
stationary bequest distribution to exist under the Solow steady state, agents in
the economy should not pass on more wealth than the sum of wealth they have
inherited and wage income they have earned when they are young, as in the style
31







∣∣∣∣< 1⇒ bit+1 < yit . (1.53)
From the economy’s perspective, the condition |φ∗1 |< 1 implies that agents’
subjective discount rate for the future is large (β is small) relative to the gross
















In Bossmann et al. (2007), the mobility, proxied by the correlation of parent-
child inherited wealth, depends on time along the equilibrium path to the long-
run steady-state’s correlation value. In this chapter, by normalizing the inherited
wealth to the total output, the intergenerational mobility ρ1, determined by the
autoregressive coefficient φ∗1 , is constant throughout the equilibrium path to the
steady-state. Wan and Zhu (2012) do not characterize the intergenerational mo-
bility as they generalize Bossmann et al. (2007) by relaxing the assumption of
finite variance of the labor productivity shocks; thereupon they are silent on the
lineage bequest evolution.
27See Daily Mail (June 9, 2011). Interview with Bill Gates by Caroline Graham, "This is not
the way I’d imagined Bill Gates... A rare and remarkable interview with the world’s second
richest man."
Retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-2001697/Microsofts-Bill-
Gates-A-rare-remarkable-interview-worlds-second-richest-man.html, on November 14, 2014.
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1.3.5 Cross-sectional distributions at Solow steady state
Proposition 1.6. Since |φ∗1 |< 1, the cross-sectional inequality of bequests, mea-




, which is less than the cross sec-
tional inequality of wages, σl . The higher the standard deviation of the idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks or cross sectional inequality of wages, σl , the higher
the cross sectional inequality.
Proof. From the asymptotic distribution for a covariance-stationary process28,
the inequality of labor income and bequests in the asymptotic cross-sectional



























































The implications of Proposition 1.6 is that, if the wealth inheritance is a
covariance-stationary process, and in the absence of heterogenous capital re-
turns, and stochastic mortality (hence stochastic bequests), the intergenerational
transfers serve the purpose of private insurance or risk pooling across gener-
ations within the same lineage for idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks, to
28See Hamilton (1994, pp. 186–195: Section 7.2. Limit Theorems for Serially Dependent
Observations).
29The coefficient of variation, as a measure of inequality, is scale invariant.
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t . This result concurs with Bossmann
et al. (2007) and Wan and Zhu (2012) as expected, where only the neoclas-
sical growth model is analysed. To establish this stationary asymptotic cross-
sectional distribution of wealth inherited to total output, I use the covariance-
stationarity assumption and associated properties of the time series; whereas
Bossmann et al. (2007) use 2-series theorem, and Wan and Zhu (2012) use The-
orem 1 of Brandt (1986), Lorenz dominance and convex order. In subsequent
sections, we shall extend the results of Bossmann et al. (2007) to cover the case
of endogenous growth with innovation in the style of Romer.
Furthermore, from Proposition 1.6, an exogenous increase in σl will lead
to an increase in cross-sectional inequality of bequest to output ratio. Thus,
any change in labor force demographics, distribution of human capital, labor-
augmenting technology, or degree of openness of an economy that may increase
the spread of idiosyncratic productivity of the labor force, will henceforth result
in a higher cross-sectional inequality of bequest to output. Examples of changes
in spread of productivity or human capital brought about by education, technol-
ogy or globalized production chains include Davies et al. (2005), Acemoglu and
Autor (2012) and Costinot et al. (2012) respectively. A time trend in the wage
dispersion is also reported in a study by Krueger et al. (2010). They find a keen
and sustained sharp increase in cross-sectional wage dispersion during the last
thirty years for Canada, UK and the US, with the variance of male log wages
increasing by about 40%. However, according to them, observable characteris-
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tics such as experience and education, only partially account for this increase,
and they attribute this increase in wage dispersion as largely residual in its na-
ture. In any case, an exogenous increase in labor productivity dispersion will
correspondingly lead to an increase in wage dispersion and an increase cross-
sectional inequality of wealth in this chapter, hence a plausible driver for the
increase in income inequality in the United States over the last thirty years, as
depicted by Piketty (2014, pp. 24, Figure I.1).
1.3.6 Lineage bequest evolution at Romer steady state
Let the double-asterisk superscript represents the Romer steady state. At the
Romer steady state, k∗∗ ≡ 1+ (G−1)θ > 1. Let Yt+1 = GYt , Kt+1 = GKt , and
Rt+1 = Rt ≡ R∗∗. At the Romer regime, from the capital share at equilibrium,














At Romer steady state, substituting R∗∗= (1− 1σ )A into the law of motion of the
bequests for an agent of lineage i (1.39), normalizing by the total output, Yt+1,






































[lit − lt ].
At the Romer steady state, the ratio of bequest to total output inherited by a
young agent from lineage i at any time t, is a first order non-homogenous equa-
tion. Note that the law of motion of lineage bequest normalized by output is
identical to that in the Solow regime, as stated in equation (1.40).
Proposition 1.7. The dynamics of lineage bequest normalized by the final out-
put, and hence the asymptotic cross-sectional distributions are identical under
both the Solow and Romer steady states.
Proof. As shown in equations (1.40) and (1.57). 
While the dynamics are identical, a subtle difference exists in terms of inter-
pretation for the agents’ optimization for stationarity. Arising from the condi-
tion for the existence of covariance stationarity, unlike in the Solow steady state,
agents under the Romer regime can pass on more wealth than the sum of wealth
they have inherited and wage income they have earned when young to their next
generation, provided that is less than the gross growth of the economy. That is,




yit , and |φ∗1 |=
∣∣∣∣ R∗∗βµG[1+β (1+µ)]
∣∣∣∣< 1,
⇒ bit+1 < Gyit .
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plies that agents subjective discount rate for the future is large relative to the
ratio of gross return on capital to gross output growth, R
∗∗
G or equivalently rela-















That is, for models with constant capital share and homothetic preference such
that agents save a constant fraction of income, it is the interplay between the
capital share to savings rate relative to the discount rate and bequest motive
that determines the stationarity of the bequest distribution, and not the moot
point on capital returns to growth ratio, R/G alone. The right hand side of the
inequality represents the preference primitives, while the left hand side embeds
the institutional structure as elucidated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2014).
In the current model, this covariance stationary condition is slack and not
binding, as the AR(1) coefficient which dependent only on the elasticity of sub-
stitution (or monopoly power ) and the strength of the bequest motive, σ and µ
respectively, is always less than 1.
1.3.7 Cross-sectional distributions at Romer steady state
Proposition 1.8.
(i) The gross growth rate of cross-sectional expected value of bequests in the
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Romer steady state is (Ω1Ω3A)> 1, while that equals 1 in the Solow steady
state.
(ii) The gross growth rate of cross-sectional variance of bequests in the Romer
steady state is (Ω1Ω3A)2 > 1, while that equals 1 in the Solow steady state.
(iii) However, using CV as a measure of inequality, the cross sectional inequal-
ity of bequests to total income under the Romer and Solow steady states
are equivalent, if the stationarity assumption for the law of motion holds
in both steady states.
Proof. Unlike the Solow steady state where, Yt+1 =Yt =Y ∗, in the Romer steady

















. But, CV as an inequality measure is invari-
















While Wolff (1992) finds that the Great Depression has a considerable effect
on the inequality of wealth, Krueger et al. (2010) do not find such a link between
wealth inequality and recessions, citing the recessions in Sweden and Italy in
the 1990s as examples, as those recessions were not associated with significant
changes in asset prices. Thus, changes in growth rate alone, although an easy
suspect, is not a sufficient factor driving changes in wealth inequality.
38
1.3.8 Lineage bequest evolution and cross-sectional distribu-
tions for period-2 cycles
Having done the groundwork to characterize the dynamics of the bequest dis-
tributions for both the Solow and Romer steady states, the derivation of lineage
bequest evolution for period-2 cycle follows. Note that for period-2 cycles, out-
put growth occurs at both the Solow and Romer regimes. Let the superscripts
L and H denote the fixed points with the lower and higher normalized capital
respectively. Let RL be the gross return on capital for the fixed point, kL; RH be
the gross return on capital for the fixed point, kH ; and GL be the gross growth
rate of output for the period-2 fixed point in the Solow regime, and G, as stated
earlier, is the gross growth rate along the balanced growth path in the Romer
regime.
From the capital share at equilibrium, equation (1.27), the savings rate, equa-
tion(1.30), and the gross growth rate of variables along period-2 cycles in Propo-


























Using the iterated fixed points of the period-2 cycles: kt+1 = kH , kt = kL,
kt−1 = kH , and kt−2 = kL, by recursive substitution into the law of motion of
bequest, equation (1.39), and normalizing using the final output, we get,
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where φR ≡ RHβµG[1+β (1+µ)] = φS ≡ R
Lβµ






tra notations are introduced to facilitate the exposition, even though the param-
eter values are the same.)




















zHit+1−φH2 zHit−1 = [lit − lt ]+φS[lit−1− lt−1]≡ uit+1+φSuit , (1.61)
where uit+1 and u
i
t ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2l ).









1−φRφS , where Ω4 =
φS








zLit −φL2 zLit−2 = [lit−1− lt−1]+φR[lit−2− lt−2]≡ uit +φRuit−1, (1.62)
where uit and u
i
t−1 ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2l ).
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Proposition 1.9. Since
∣∣φH2 ∣∣= ∣∣φL2 ∣∣= ∣∣(φ∗1 )2∣∣< 1, then zHit+1 and zLit are covari-


























































































































































∀k ≥ 2. (1.69)





t , where L is the lag operator, and for z
H or L,i
t+1 to be stationary, the
roots of the characteristic equations, (1− φ2L2) = 0, must lie outside the unit
circle, hence |φ2|< 1, or equivalently, |φ∗21 |< 1. From (1.52), 0≤ φ∗1 < 1, thus∣∣φH2 ∣∣ = ∣∣φL2 ∣∣ = ∣∣(φ∗1 )2∣∣ < 1, and the conditions for covariance-stationarity for
the ARMA(2,1) process are met30. To compute the moments, the notation is




zt = φ2zt−2+ut +φ1ut−1
= φ∗21 zt−2+ut +φ
∗
1 ut−1 (1.70)
where ut and ut−1 ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2l ).














































































γ(2) = φ∗21 γ(0). (1.73)
Substituting γ(2) from (1.73) into γ(0) from (1.71), we get:















γ(k) = E[zt−kzt ] = φ∗21 E[zt−kzt−2]+E[zt−kut ]+φ
∗
1 E[zt−kut−1] ∀k ≥ 2
= φ∗21 E[zt−kzt−2] = φ
∗2
1 γ(k−1) ∀k ≥ 2. (1.75)

Proposition 1.10. With i.i.d. labor productivity shocks, for period-2 cycles, the
mean and variances of the bequest to output ratio as well as the intergenera-
tional mobilities are the same for both the Solow and Romer fixed points, and
they are also identical to those under the Solow or Romer steady states.
Proof. By inspection of the moments in Proposition 1.9. 
1.4 Comments on the distribution equivalence be-
tween Solow and Romer regimes
1.4.1 Implications for generating evolving inequality of wealth
over time
For linear models, in the absence of financial frictions, there is no distinction
on whether the lifetime resource at young is obtained through earned wages or
through bequest as long as they are indistinguishable when invested. Whether
the real wages are stagnant or growing is immaterial; as long as the labor share
to output ratio is a constant, both the Solow and Romer regimes yield equivalent
dynamics and distributions after normalising for growth.
Thus, a way to generate an evolving cross-sectional inequality of inherited
wealth over time is via an exogenous change in the primitive parameters in
the model such as the spread of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks, as dis-
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cussed in Proposition 1.6. Other factors include exogenous fiscal shocks, such
as changes in inheritance tax or innovation subsidies. This approach is adopted
by Piketty (2011), where to match the long-run evolution of inheritance from
1820, as well as for projection into 2050, he simulated the data with exogenous
changes in the differentiated savings rates, bequest ratios, and capital taxes, as
well as exogenous capital losses due to destruction shocks, for different time
segments.
Yet another alternative is the introduction of financial frictions (e.g. credit
constraints or indivisible lumpy investment), or differentiated capital embedded
in endogenous growth such that the rich can have favorable access to profitable
investment projects during regimes when returns on capital are higher; or finally,
a production mechanism, where capital share is not a constant fraction of final
output. Particularly, to obtain cyclical inequality dynamics over different growth
regimes, the key is to generate heterogenous returns on wealth (via heterogenous
capital returns or human capital returns) both across agents within the same
cohort and across the different regimes. In this model, while the returns on
capital are different across the 2 regimes, the capital share are unchanged over
the 2 regimes, and all agents have equal access to the capital markets with their
wealth, without any distinction between wealth earned through labor income or
inherited, resulting in equivalence across the 2 different regimes.
For future research, extensions with models of innovation satisfying both
conditions will be looked into using this covariance-stationary technique to
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study cyclical evolution of inequality. For this thesis, in Chapter 4, as with
existing literature, I shall fall back on using exogenous changes to explain the
evolving inequality across time. These exogenous fiscal policy changes are tax
rate on bequest and innovation subsidies, and they are empirically motivated.
While the impact of bequest has been explored under neoclassical growth by
Bossmann et al. (2007) and Wan and Zhu (2012), and the impact of invest-
ment subsidy by García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2007), I hope to complement
the existing research by providing a tractable analytical characterization of im-
pact of these fiscal policies on the transition and lineage bequest evolution of
inequality (i.e. intergenerational mobility), beyond the cross-sectional distribu-
tion consequences at steady states, for growth under both regimes and cycles,
without using numerical simulations.
1.4.2 Implications for policy makers
Further, for pedagogical purposes, the distributional equivalence under different
growth regimes is informative in defining desideratum in the economy’s fiscal
policies. Unlike Piketty (2011, 2014), the difference between the gross return
on capital and the gross growth rate of an economy, consequently r− g, does
not drive the cross-sectional inequality of inherited wealth in this model. Serv-
ing as the pivotal points to this result here are (i) the constant labor to output
share in the long run (allowing for exogenous occasional changes in the labor
shares via changes in the price elasticity of final sector’s demand during transi-
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tion to the stationary distribution), and (ii) the absence of financial frictions in
the economy. The degree of validity of these pivots are empirically falsifiable,
by bringing closer together macro-data such as national accounts and micro-
data on household labor and finances. Schneider (2011) provides a survey on
the labor share literature, both theoretical and empirical.
The second pivotal point: access to the capital markets by agents, rich or
poor, merits discussion. The lynchpin in Piketty (2011, 2014) is the "class sav-
ing" model, where the savings rate out of labor and capital income are exoge-
nously differentiated. In the benchmark case (Piketty (2011, pp.1107)), agents
consume 100% of their labor income by assumption, thus all savings in the
economy come only from the returns to inherited wealth. In addition, Piketty
(2011, pp. 1105) assumes growth to be exogenous, driven by changes in produc-
tivity, within a Cobb-Douglas production function, with 2 factors of production:
non-human capital Kt , and human capital Ht = Ltegt , where Lt is the labor sup-
ply and g is the exogenous rate of productivity growth. With this set-up, Piketty
(2011, pp. 1112–1113) posits that even if workers save out of their labor income,
the steady-state inheritance converges quickly to the benchmark "class savings"
model when the growth rate approaches 0 (e.g. in the region of 1 to 2%). Piketty
(2011, pp. 1115) also explores a finite-horizon wealth-in-utility saving model,
with the same production function, arriving at the same steady-state conver-
gence with the "class-savings" model, for agents with identical preference, but
ex-ante heterogenous endowments of wealth.
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Thus, implicit in Piketty (2011, pp.1074) "r > g logic": if rate of returns
to private wealth exceeds rate of growth of the economy, inequality is exacer-
bated, is the limited ability for the workers without inheritance to participate in
the capital market, hence its dividends from economic growth. Based on his
"r > g logic", Piketty (2011, 2014) postulates an increase in taxes on capital to
regulate the size of the steady-state inheritance flows to curb the rising inequal-
ity of wealth, without impinging upon the exogenously driven growth rate of
the economy. Note that the mobility in his "class saving" model is zero, with
permanent stratification of the society, except when taxes and redistribution are
taken to the extreme of ex-post equality for all.
In contrast, the "r > g logic" does not apply in this model of endogenous
growth with innovation, since the wealth distributions under Solow and Romer
regimes are equivalent, if all agents, regardless of their wealth, are able to op-
timise their savings and consumption decisions, and participate in capital mar-
kets with homogenous returns. While the preference in this model with bequest
motive is similar to the reduced form of the finite-horizon wealth-in-utility sav-
ings model used by Piketty (2011, pp. 1115), with idiosyncratic labor pro-
ductivity draws, I manage to avoid the social stratification that results in his
model with labor income mobility via productivity draws, while achieving a
non-degenerate distribution of inherited wealth, regardless whether agents were
ex-ante homogenous or heterogenous in terms of their wealth. Moreover, unlike
Piketty (2011), with the production function used in this model, both the savings
47
rate and growth rate are endogenously determined. Thus, I posit that improving
access to capital markets (both physical and human) and the reduction of fric-
tions (such as investment quantum through vehicles such as investment trusts,
and quality public schools), and informational disadvantage (through improved
reporting standards and investment literacy programmes) may be helpful to pro-
mote mobility, and to cap inequality arising from capital market inaccessibility
(and hence the inability to partake in the growth dividends of the economy).
1.4.3 Technical implications
With the distributional equivalence of the inherited wealth to output ratio under
i.i.d. productivity shocks, I have effectively characterized the global lineage evo-
lution of inherited wealth to output ratio, as well as the long-run cross-sectional
distribution of inherited wealth to output ratio. This has novel implications when
combined with the results from Gardini et al. (2008) and Mitra (2001). Mitra
(2001) presents a sufficient condition for topological chaos for unimodal maps
that do not satisfy the Li-Yorke condition. Gardini et al. (2008) have character-
ized the global aggregate dynamics of the Matsuyama (1999) model, and shown
that the economy can grow via an attracting chaotic interval, 2-cyclical chaotic
intervals, 4-cyclical chaotic intervals, attracting period-2 cycles, attracting fixed
point in Romer regime, or converge to an attracting fixed point in the Solow
regime, depending on the parameter values of σ and G in the Matsuyama (1999)
model, as it is topologically equivalent to a skewed tent map.
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Furthermore, I can subsequently relax the finite variance assumption of the
idiosyncratic shocks. If the idiosyncratic shocks, lt is stationary and ergodic,
with a finite mean, I can proceed to characterize the cross-sectional wealth dis-
tribution and compare the inequality using convex order and Lorenz dominance
as in Zhu (2013a) and Wan and Zhu (2012). By relaxing the finite variance as-
sumption, I can then bring the model to the wealth data that displays fat-tails
(e.g. in Piketty (2011) and Piketty (2014)), where the right-tail cannot be cap-
tured with the finite variance assumption.
As noted by Stachurski (2009), for stable invariant distribution to exist, there
is positive probability of moving between any 2 points of space within a fi-
nite time, to ensure distribution is ergodic. Thus, by incorporating bequest mo-
tive and i.i.d. idiosyncratic productivity shocks into the Matsuyama (1999), the
economy is never stratified globally, since the global wealth distribution is stable
and invariant, even though the aggregate growth dynamics can be chaotic.
1.5 Comparative statics
1.5.1 Impact of an increase in bequest motive, µ , on lineage
and cross-sectional distribution
Proposition 1.11. Without bequests, correlation in wealth is 0. That is, wealth
is determined by own i.i.d. labor income, and there is perfect mobility. In the
presence of a bequest motive, the higher the bequest motive, µ , the higher the
correlation of the ratio of bequests to total output across generations from the
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same dynasty, the lower the intergenerational mobility.
Proof. From the correlation equation (1.49),












Proposition 1.12. The higher the bequest motive, µ , the lower the asymptotic
cross-sectional spread of bequests, the lower the cross-sectional bequest in-














































With the "joy-of-giving" bequest motive, an increase in bequest motive re-
duces both intergenerational mobility and cross-sectional inequality of inherited
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wealth under i.i.d. labor productivity shocks. That is, bequest functions as an
intergenerational risk pooling device for idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks.
This extends the robustness of role of bequest in intergenerational risk sharing
by Becker and Tomes (1979) and Bossmann et al. (2007) to a model of en-
dogenous growth (with innovation and cycles). This result contrasts with Zhu
(2014), where investment risk is introduced into Becker and Tomes (1979). The
difference in the resulting wealth inequality in relations to the strength of the
bequest motive highlight the need to read beyond the headlines (R versus G),
to identify the fundamental driver(s) of inequality (e.g. heterogeneous returns
on capital or investment versus heterogeneous returns on labor), with bequest
acting merely as a vehicle to propagate the heterogeneity. In this model, the re-
turns on capital are homogeneous, so too the strength of the bequest motive (see
Charles and Hurst (2002) for models with varying bequest motives in agents’
preferences), thus bequest itself is rank preserving, mitigating the productivity
risks of subsequent generations within a lineage.
1.5.2 Impact of an increase in price elasticity, σ , on lineage
and cross-sectional distribution
Proposition 1.13. The higher the price elasticity of the final sector’s demand for
each intermediate, σ (and correspondingly, higher capital share, lower wage
share, as well as lower monopoly margin for innovation), the higher the corre-
lation of the ratio of bequests to total output across generations from the same














Proposition 1.14. The higher the price elasticity of the final sector’s demand for
each intermediate, σ (and correspondingly, higher capital share, lower wage
share, as well as lower monopoly margin for innovation), the lower the asymp-
totic cross-sectional spread of bequests, the lower the cross-sectional bequest












































The impact of price elasticity of the final sector’s demand for each interme-
diate, hence the monopoly margin for innovation is absent in Becker and Tomes
(1979); Charles and Hurst (2002); Bossmann et al. (2007); García-Peñalosa and
Turnovsky (2007) and García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2011). In Becker and
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Tomes (1979) and Charles and Hurst (2002), production is not explicitly mod-
elled, and changes in the endowment generating process is used to study the
distribution of income or wealth and the intergenerational mobility. The papers
by Bossmann et al. (2007) and García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2011) use the
Neoclassical growth model, where the former has inelastic labor, and the latter,
elastic labor with agents holding different initial capital endowments. García-
Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2007) use an endogenous growth model with elastic
labor, but no innovation.
Piketty and Zucman (2014) discuss the role of capital share on the wealth to
income ratio arising from changes in technology, with a 2-factor CES production
function. If the capital-labor elasticity of substitution is larger than 1, capital
share in the national income increases as wealth to income ratio increases (due to
the changes in the relative prices of the factors of production), and an exogenous
decrease in growth rate (due to a decrease in population or productivity growth)
results in a higher wealth-income ratio in the long run.
In this model, the returns on capital across all agents who saved are homoge-
nous and thus rank preserving, although it can vary across time. Thus mobility is
driven by the idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks. A decrease in wage share
will decrease intergenerational mobility and decrease cross-sectional wealth in-
equality. Thus, the higher the price elasticity of the final sector’s demand for
each intermediate, the lower the monopoly margin for innovation, the lower the
wage share (since labor is used only in the production of the final good via
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a Cobb-Douglas production), the lower the intergenerational mobility, and the
lower the cross-sectional bequest inequality. As a result of the Cobb-Douglas
production function in the final good sector, with labor and intermediates as fac-
tor inputs, unlike the CES used in Piketty and Zucman (2014), the capital share
in this thesis is constant regardless of the growth regimes, and the endogenous
growth rate is a function of the price elasticity of the final sector’s demand for
each intermediate good.
Financial frictions such as credit constraints, indivisible investment quan-
tum, and differential access to the capital markets (e.g. closed-end funds and
exclusive contracts by venture capitalists in start-ups), or stochastic idiosyn-
cratic capital returns with lineage correlation, if present, will further stratify the
mobility structure by introducing heterogeneity in the capital returns faced by
agents.
1.6 Correlated productivity shocks
1.6.1 Characterization of lineage bequest evolution with cor-
related productivity shocks at the Solow and Romer steady
states
Empirical estimates of the elasticity of son’s earnings with respect to father’s
earnings from different data sources and countries range from 0.11 to 0.57, sug-
gesting that presence of intergenerational correlation of income. (See Mazumder
(2005); Solon (2004, 2002, 1992); Zimmerman (1992)). By using 2 intergenera-
tional links via parent’s bequest motives and productivity inheritance, De Nardi
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(2004) finds that voluntary bequest motive (also known as "warm-glow" bequest
by Andreoni (1989)) explains the existence of large inheritance, while earnings
persistence further concentrates the cross-sectional distribution of inheritance,
when calibrated against both the US and Swedish data. Thus, in this section,
we study the impact of correlated productivity (alternative reduced-form inter-
pretations include correlated genes, health, human or social capital) that affects
idiosyncratic labor efficiency. As with Davies and Kuhn (1991), Bossmann et al.
(2007) and Wan and Zhu (2012), adopting a mean-reverting correlated idiosyn-
cratic labor productivity process, let:
lit = lt +ν(l
i
t−1− lt−1)+ ε it , (1.80)




, such that σ2l is finite,
and that the i.i.d. shocks represented by ε it has a lower bound sufficient to keep
lit > 0. The process is initiated by l
i
0 = l + ε
i
0. For illustration, the following
exposition on correlated shocks is based on either one of the steady states, e.g.






















. Thus, the mean
reverting correlated idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks implies:
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lit − lt
















































= ε it ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2l ).
(1.83)
With mean reverting correlated shocks as specified in (1.80), the ratio of
bequest to total output inherited by a young agent from lineage i at any time t,
is a second order non-homogenous difference equation.
Let the superscript m denotes the mean-reverting correlated labor productiv-












. Lineage dynamics from
(1.83) can be expressed as follows:
zmit+1 − φm1 zmit − φm2 zmit−1 =
[
lit − lt
]− ν [lit−1− lt−1] ≡ ε it ∼ i.i.d. (0,σ2l ),
(1.84)



















Expanding, we get an AR(2) process for the dynamics of zmit+1 and corre-




from equations (1.84) and (1.83). This is equiv-
alent to the mixing of 2 ARMA processes, that is, for equation (1.82), the sum
of 2 AR(1) processes is an AR(2) process.













































































































































































ρk = φm1 ρk−1+φ
m
2 ρk−2 ∀k ≥ 1
= (φ∗1 +ν)ρk−1+(−φ∗1ν)ρk−2 ∀k ≥ 1. (1.92)
Proof. See Hamilton (1994) for conditions for covariance-stationarity for AR(2).
Essentially, the equation (1.84) can be expressed as (1−φm1 L−φm2 L2)z∗it+1 = ε it ,
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where L is the lag operator, and for zmit+1 to be stationary, the roots of the char-
acteristic equation, (1− φm1 L − φm2 L2) = 0, must lie outside the unit circle.
Let the roots be Li where i = 1 & 2. For |Li| > 1,
∣∣∣ 1Li ∣∣∣ < 1, which implies∣∣∣ 1L1 · 1L2 ∣∣∣= ∣∣φm2 ∣∣< 1, and ∣∣∣ 1L1 + 1L2 ∣∣∣= ∣∣φm1 ∣∣< 2.
















The moments for this AR(2) process can be calculated from the difference equa-
tion (1.84) directly, assuming covariance stationarity. To simplify notation, su-
perscripts are dropped, and the time index on the moving average innovations
are rescaled, by defining uit ≡ ε it−1.
zt = φ1zt−1+φ2zt−2+ut , (1.95)
γ(0) = E[ztzt ] = φ1E[ztzt−1]+φ2E[ztzt−2]+E[ztut ]
= φ1γ(1)+φ2γ(2)+σ2l , (1.96)
γ(k) = E[zt−kzt ] = φ1E[zt−kzt−1]+φ2E[zt−kzt−2]+E[zt−kut ]
= φ1γ(k−1)+φ2γ(k−2)+0 ∀k ≥ 1. (1.97)
From the variance(1.96) and covariances (1.97) respectively,
ρk = φ1ρk−1+φ2ρk−2 ∀k ≥ 1. (1.98)
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The introduction of mean reverting idiosyncratic productivity shocks that
are correlated across generations of the same lineage, but i.i.d. across agents
from the cohort does not change the expected ratio of bequest to final output.
However, the variance and covariances are modified, hence affecting the lineage
mobility and cross-sectional inequality.
Proposition 1.16. In the presence of autocorrelated productivity shocks, the
correlation of the ratio of bequests to total output across generations from the
same dynasty is higher; hence the intergenerational inherited wealth mobility is
lower. The higher the autocorrelation of intergenerational productivity shocks,
ν , the higher the correlation of bequest to output ratio across generations, the



























































· [(2ν+φ∗1 −2φ∗21 ν)(1+φ∗1ν)− [φ∗21 +ν2+φ∗1ν(1−φ∗1ν)]φ∗1 ]
=




While intuitive, the impact of correlated productivity shocks (or "correlation
of abilities" by Bossmann et al. (2007)) on the lineage mobility is not discussed
in both Wan and Zhu (2012) and Bossmann et al. (2007). This is because to
characterize the lineage mobility, I invoke the covariance-stationarity property
of the time series not used by Bossmann et al. (2007). This property is not avail-
able in Wan and Zhu (2012) as they seek to generalize Bossmann et al. (2007)
by relaxing the finite variance assumption of the labor productivity shocks.
1.6.2 Impact on cross-sectional distribution at steady states
with correlated productivity shocks
Proposition 1.17. In the presence of correlated productivity shocks, the cross
sectional inequality of the ratio of bequests to total output is more than the
economy with i.i.d. productivity shocks. The higher the autocorrelation of in-
tergenerational productivity shocks, ν , the higher the asymptotic cross-sectional
spread of bequests, the higher the cross-sectional bequest inequality at the steady
states.
Proof. Since the expected value of the bequest to output ratio are identical under
both i.i.d. shocks and mean reverting correlated shocks as specified, the ratio of
60

























with ν = 0
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This result is consistent with the results from Bossmann et al. (2007) and
Wan and Zhu (2012), derived using different assumptions and methods, as stated
in Section 1.3.5.
From Propositions 1.16 and 1.17, persistence in the labor productivity shocks
within a lineage is thus undesirable from the Rawlsian’s "veil of ignorance" per-
spective (Rawls (2009)) and instructive for policy makers.
61
1.6.3 Role of bequest motive on lineage bequest evolution and
cross-sectional distribution at steady states with corre-
lated shocks
Proposition 1.18. In the presence of correlated productivity shocks, the higher
the bequest motive, µ , the higher the correlation of the ratio of bequests to total
output across generations from the same dynasty, the lower the intergenera-
tional mobility at the steady states.
















































Proposition 1.19. In the presence of correlated productivity shocks, an increase
in bequest motive decreases cross sectional inequality of the ratio of bequest to
total output at the steady states.
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That is, at steady states, bequest remains an intergenerational risk pooling
device, even with intergenerational mean reverting correlated shocks, reducing
the cross-sectional inequality of wealth at the steady states. However, with cor-
related shocks, we have introduced persistence to the outcome of wealth within
a lineage, by slowing the exponential decay property of a covariance-stationary
AR process, and increasing the "memory" of both good and bad draws of labor
productivity shocks, thus lowering the intergenerational mobility.
1.6.4 Characterization of lineage bequest evolution and cross-
sectional distributions for period-2 cycle with correlated
shocks
Similarly via the mixing of ARMA processes, with correlated productivity shocks,

































)−ν2(lit−2− lt−2) = νε it−1, we get:
(1.110)(
lit − lt
)−ν(lit−1− lt−1)+ν (lit−1− lt−1)−ν2(lit−2− lt−2) = ε it +νε it−1.
(1.111)





























































By iterative substitution, we get an ARMA(4,2) process for each of the fixed



















































































1−φ cm2 −φ cm4
)
. Lineage dynamics of
period-2 cycles with mean reverting productivity shocks from (1.114) can be
expressed as follows:
zcmit+1−φ cm2 zcmit−1−φ cm4 zcmit−3 =
[
lit − lt
]−ν2 [lit−2− lt−2]= ε it +θ1ε it−1+θ2ε it−2
(1.115)
where φ cm2 =
(
φ∗21 +ν

















= δ1, and ε it ,ε it−1, ε
i
t−2 ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2l ).
For each of the fixed points, the asymptotic cross-sectional distribution can
be derived from the lineage bequest evolution,
zcmit+1−φ cm2 zcmit−1−φ cm4 zcmit−3 = ε it +θ1ε it−1+θ2ε it−2. (1.116)
Proposition 1.20. Since






































× [1+φ∗21 +ν(2φ∗1 +φ∗31 )+ν2(1+2φ∗21 +φ∗41 )
+ν3(φ∗1 +2φ
∗3

















































































= ρ1 = [(1+φ∗21 )(1+ν
2)(ν+φ∗1 )(1+νφ
∗
1 )]÷ . . .







1 )+ . . .
. . .ν3(φ∗1 +2φ
∗3


















+ [(φ∗1 +ν)(1−ν4)(1−ν2φ∗21 )(1−φ∗41 )]÷ . . .
. . .{(1+φ∗21 ν2)[1+φ∗21 +ν(2φ∗1 +φ∗31 )+ν2(1+2φ∗21 +φ∗4)+ . . .
. . .ν3(φ∗1 +2φ
∗3









































































= ρk = φ2ρk−2+φ4ρk−4 = (φ∗21 +ν
2)ρk−2−φ∗21 ν2ρk−4∀k ≥ 3.
(1.128)
Proof. Essentially, the equation (1.116) can be expressed as:
(1−φ cm2 L2−φ cm4 L4)zcmit+1 = ε it +θ1ε it−1+θ2ε it−2, (1.129)
where L is the lag operator, and for zcmit+1 to be stationary, the roots of the char-
acteristic equation, (1− φ cm2 L2− φ cm4 L4) = 0, must lie outside the unit circle.
Let the roots be Li where i = 1,2,3 and 4. (1−φ cm2 L2−φ cm4 L4) is a biquadratic
equation. Let B= L2, and B1 and B2 be the roots of (1−φ cm2 B−φ cm4 B2) = 0. Let
L1 and L2 be the positive and negative square root of B1, and L3 and L4 be the
positive and negative square root of B2. For |Li|> 1 or
∣∣∣ 1Li ∣∣∣< 1, the following 2
conditions have to be met:
∣∣∣ 1B1 · 1B2 ∣∣∣= ∣∣φ cm4 ∣∣< 1, and ∣∣∣ 1B1 + 1B2 ∣∣∣= ∣∣φ cm2 ∣∣< 2.
|φ cm2 |= |φ∗21 +ν2|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 (σ −1)µ1+σµ︸ ︷︷ ︸




















With covariance-stationarity, we can compute the covariances and correla-
tions of the lineage bequest evolution. The algebraic manipulations are shown
in Appendix A.3. 
By comparing Propositions 1.15 and 1.20, it can be seen that the equiv-
alance of asymptotic cross-sectional distribution between the steady states and
period-2 cycles in Proposition 1.10 no longer holds if the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks are correlated. Unlike the steady states where the growth rates
are identical for every generation, under period-2 cycles, the growth rates of
faced by alternating generations are different. If productivity shocks are i.i.d.
across each generation, the difference in the growth rates between the Solow
and Romer regime will be immaterial once the inherited wealth is normalized
by the total output, to keep the scale constant for comparison. However, if the
productivity shocks are correlated across generations within a lineage, the good
or bad luck is propagated via both the bequests as well as the next generation’s
productivity draw, hence differences in the growth rates between the Solow and
Romer regimes will be accumulated over the cycle, resulting in a difference in
the variance of the asymptotic cross-sectional distributions between the steady
states and the period-2 cycles for correlated labor productivity shocks as stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.21. In the presence of correlated productivity shocks, the cross-
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sectional inequality of the ratio of bequests to total output under period-2 cycles
is greater (less) than that under steady states if the correlation of mean reverting
productivity shocks, ν ≥ (<) [φ∗31 +ν2(φ∗1 +φ∗51 )+ν4(φ∗31 )].
Proof. By taking a simple difference of the variances of the cross-sectional
distributions between the steady states and the period-2 cycles with correlated
shocks. 
The threshold compares ν on the left against a polynomial of ν with coeffi-
cients that are functions of φ∗1 , and implicitly the bequest motive µ , on the right.
This is because inheritance via bequest narrows the cross-sectional wealth in-
equality through risk sharing across generations of the same lineage as the rate
of returns on capital, while different across generations of the same lineage in
a period-2 cycle, is the same for each cohort. However, inheritance via ability
through the correlated productivity shocks increases the cross-sectional wealth
as the good or bad productivity draws across generations of the same lineage
persist in a period-2 cycle, and are different across agents of the same cohort.
1.6.5 Impact on cross-sectional distributions under period-2
cycles with correlated productivity shocks
Proposition 1.22. The higher the autocorrelation of intergenerational produc-
tivity shocks, ν , the higher the asymptotic cross-sectional spread of bequests, the

























Just like the steady states, for period-2 cycle, cross-sectional inequality in-
creases with the persistence of inherited ability. The impact of correlation of












1.6.6 Role of bequest motive on lineage bequest evolution and
cross-sectional distributions under period-2 cycles with
correlated shocks
Under period-2 cycles, with correlated productivity shocks, the role of bequests
on lineage and cross-sectional inequality depends on the interaction of the be-
quest motive and the magnitude of the correlation of the mean reverting shocks.
This is due to the interaction between the magnitude of the "ability inheri-
tance" with the autoregressive coefficient in the absence of correlated shocks,
φ∗1 =
(σ−1)µ
1+σµ , arising from the bequest motive, resulting in the comparative stat-
ics for lineage mobility and the cross-sectional inequality with respect to bequest
motive being ambiguous, unlike the steady state cases in Propositions 1.18 and
1.19.
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Using covariance-stationarity, and normalizing the inherited wealth with total
output, it can be seen that intergenerational mobility and cross-sectional inequal-
ity at either Solow or Romer steady states are identical for both idiosyncratic and
mean reverting correlated shocks. The existence of a covariance-stationary dis-
tributions over period-2 cycles with fixed points on Solow and Romer growth
regimes is proven and characterized. While Matsuyama (1999) has shown that
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the aggregate growth over period-2 cycles are higher than at either of the steady
states, we extend that result by showing that wealth inequality over period-2
cycles, measured in terms of coefficient of variation, are identical to the steady
states under i.i.d. idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
More explicitly, under i.i.d. idiosyncratic productivity shocks, for all fixed
points, at steady states or period-2 cycles, the cross-sectional inequality of wealth
are identical, even though the growth rates differ. Thus, from this chapter, it can
be seen that differences in the rate of returns on capital versus the output growth
could just be a red herring to the evolution of wealth inequality in the last cen-
tury. The crux may lie with the confluence of the exogenous and endogenous in-
stitutional structures related to fiscal policies (Benabou (2000); García-Peñalosa
and Turnovsky (2007, 2011), education and technology (Davies et al. (2005);
Acemoglu and Autor (2012), and trade and industrial relations (Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006); Costinot et al. (2012, 2013)). In the following chapters,
I shall explore the role of consumption externality, elastic labor, and the role of
inheritance tax and innovation subsidies under specific context.
In addition, under i.i.d. idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the higher price
elasticity of the final sector’s demand for each intermediate brought about by
exogenous changes in production technology or contracting, (and correspond-
ingly, higher capital share as well as lower monopoly margin for innovation),
the lower the intergenerational mobility, and the lower the asymptotic cross-
sectional spread of bequests. This is because mobility is driven by the idiosyn-
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cratic labor productivity shocks, and a decrease in wage share will lower in-
tergenerational mobility as capital returns are homogeneous and thus wealth
inherited are rank preserving.
With correlated productivity shocks, intergenerational mobility is lower than
that with i.i.d. shocks for the steady states. The higher the correlation in the
mean reverting shocks, the higher the cross-sectional inequality for both the
steady states and period-2 cycles. This means that any structural or institutional
changes in educational policy or credit policy that can exogenously increase the
correlation of labor productivity within a lineage will increase cross-sectional
inequality.
Finally, with the "joy-of-giving" bequest motive, an increase in bequest mo-
tive reduces intergenerational mobility and cross-sectional inequality of inher-
ited wealth under both Solow and Romer steady states for both i.i.d. productiv-
ity shocks and mean reverting correlated shocks, and for period-2 cycles under
i.i.d. shocks. That is, bequest can act as intergenerational risk pooling mecha-
nism within a lineage, but across lineages, bequest is a stratifying mechanism.
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Chapter 2
Status anxiety and its impact on
mobility, inequality and growth
trajectories
2.1 Introduction
"Social status is a ranking of individuals (or groups of individ-
uals) in a given society, based on their traits, assets and actions.
[. . . ] the interest in social status as a factor in explaining behavior
stems from empirical observation that there is a substantial agree-
ment among different members of society about the relative position
of a given individual (or social position). It is this concordance of
ranking which gives social status its force as an incentive mecha-
nism. [. . . ] Because of these social rewards, each individual seeks
to increase his social status through group affiliation, investments
in assets (including human and social capital) and the appropriate
choice of actions," Weiss and Fershtman (1998, pp 802).
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Like a good that is fixed in supply, even for a growing economy, it is interest-
ing to examine how social comparison may affect the individual and aggregate
consumption and saving patterns, and the growth of an economy. Veblen (1899)
argues that wealthy individuals consume conspicuous goods and services to sig-
nal their wealth levels in order to gain self esteem. Consequently, if everyone
does that, all may end up with similar relative consumption levels, but lower
savings, hence lowering aggregate investment and growth. However, the rela-
tive consumption preferences may not negatively affect savings and growth if
individuals are willing to trade current consumption for their future status. The
hypothesis in this chapter is that status anxiety, as reflected by a relative con-
sumption preference, could affect (i) the normalized steady state capital stock in
both Solow and Romer growth regimes, (ii) the growth potential of an economy,
and hence (iii) the evolution of mobility and inequality of an economy. This
is because, as observed by De Nardi (2015), the inequality of cross-sectional
wealth distribution is higher than the inequality of cross-sectional labor earn-
ings and income. Thus, in this chapter, I explore the impact of envy, through
the introduction of consumption externality, to raise the savings rate of the rich,
hence wealth concentration, as observed in the data.
The incorporation of status anxiety, as envy, into the preference as relative
consumption is empirically motivated. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) observe
that since World War II in the United States, happiness responses are flat in the
face of considerable increases in average income. They propose two explana-
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tions for the paradox that have a stronger empirical basis: that happiness is based
on relative rather than absolute income and that happiness adapts to changes in
the level of income. Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) find that married women
are more likely to work outside the home if their sisters’ husband earn more
than their own husbands, supporting the importance of preference interdepen-
dence. Relative utility is supported from the panel data for the Netherlands in
a model estimated by Van de Stadt et al. (1985), where both one’s past con-
sumption and consumption of others influence utility. Using CEX data, Charles
et al. (2007) show that accounting for differences in income characteristics of a
reference group explains most of the racial differences in visible consumption.
In addition, they find that the relative importance of interpersonal comparisons
decreases with age. Experimental research also supports the importance of rela-
tive consumption. Alpizar et al. (2005) find that most individuals are concerned
with both relative income and relative consumption of particular goods. The
degree of concern varies in the expected direction depending on the properties
of the good.
Related literature can be classified along three dimensions: (i) the use of
status in utility, (ii) the existence of heterogeneous consumption and compar-
ison utility, and (iii) the generation of earnings and wealth distribution from
idiosyncratic risks and symmetry breaking as discussed in Chapter 1. There are
existing theoretical models that incorporate status directly into the utility func-
tion. Becker et al. (2005) introduce status as a complement to other consumption
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goods that can be bought directly in a market. Moldovanu et al. (2007) use the
relative positions in utility to study the optimal allocation of prizes in contests.
Most recently, Rayo (2013) incorporates public perceptions of one’s type into
the utility and apply that to monopolistic design and pricing of positional goods
that consumers use to signal their types.
Similar in spirit, models with heterogeneous consumption and comparison
utility are well-entrenched and driven by empirics. Carroll and Weil (1994)
and Carroll et al. (2000) suggest that habit formation may be needed to explain
time series features of consumption data. Campbell and Cochrane (1995) use a
model where individual compare their own consumption to a habit stock based
on past aggregate consumption to explain aggregate stock prices. In Constan-
tinides (1990)’s asset pricing model, individuals care about how their current
consumption compares to their own consumption in the recent past, while Abel
(1990) uses of both past aggregate comparison and past individual comparison.
Bakshi and Chen (1996) find that by incorporating "catching up with the Jone-
ses" type of status concerns into investors’ preference, the standard deviation
of the implied intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (stochastic discount
factor) can better match the Hansen-Jagannathan volatility bounds using data
from NYSE value-weighted index and long-term government bonds. Parallel to
this study, Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) examine the impact of consumption
externalities on efficient capital accumulation with a Cobb-Douglas production
technology. This chapter differs from theirs in two aspects: the functional form
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for the consumption externality, and more importantly, the production function
with innovation and cyclical endogenous growth. As a result, consumption ex-
ternality alone results in long-run distortionary effects in Turnovsky and Mon-
teiro (2007) if and only if labor is elastically supplied; whilst in this chapter,
even with inelastic labor, consumption externality will distort long-run growth
potential.
The closest paper that studies the impact of envy on both the growth and
inequality evolution dynamics is Gershman (2014). I shall briefly discuss the
modelling similarities and differences here, and consequently some differences
in the results arise. There are two types of externalities in Gershman (2014),
namely: negative consumption externality (envy); and positive intergenerational
production externality through learning-by-doing knowledge spillover (where
all agents output are perfect substitutes). In this chapter, like Gershman (2014),
there is negative consumption externality, but a threshold technological external-
ity, generated via threshold capital to variety ratio for innovative growth through
fixed cost and monopoly rent, hence driving the results that inequality may af-
fect growth through the threshold quantum of accumulated capital (not present
in another paper on envy by Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012) with neoclas-
sical growth). There are several key modelling differences. First, in Gershman
(2014), to generate asymmetry, there are two groups of agents with initially dif-
ferent endowments of capital to start with, whilst I utilise a continuum of agents
with ex-ante identical draw of labor productivities. (Agents can have ex-ante
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identical capital resources.) Second, in Gershman (2014), agents can engage in
destructive behavior with their labor hours. In my model, with property rights
well-enforced, it is equivalent to having the destruction side eliminated, result-
ing in only the "Keeping Up with Jones" behavior and equilibrium in Gershman
(2014). Third, the endogenous growth is achieved through individuals’ learning-
by-doing that generates externality via the future productivity (based on a lin-
ear (perfect substitutes) combination of both agents output). Using Matsuyama
(1999) framework for production, in this chapter, endogenous growth is attained
through innovation by variety expansion with fixed cost, where agents affect the
growth through the accumulation of capital through savings and bequest ver-
sus consumption when young and old. Among the findings from Gershman
(2014), for the long run "Keeping up with the Jones" equilibrium, which occurs
if initial inequality is low, and/or tolerance for inequality is high, agents become
identical, with no more envy driving future generations, otherwise agents are
stratified in the other possible equilibria, with zero mobility. Either way, there is
no chance for any agent to leapfrog the initial rich. In this model, distribution is
sustained by both the idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks and bequest to the
next generation. That is, there is an element of luck that may help push an agent
from a poor lineage out of poverty. That is, there is mobility in my model, and
one advantage of using covariance-stationarity for the distributional equilibrium
concept, is that the intergenerational mobility can be tracked explicitly through
the stationary covariances, and forecast with mean square error specifications
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can be made for future generations for any lineage of interest.
Key questions to be addressed are: (i) how envy may influence the growth
potential of an economy, (ii) how envy may affect aggregate saving and steady
state aggregate capital under the different growth regimes, (iii) how envy may
impact individual savings and bequest rates, such that they may vary across
the income distribution, and (iv) how envy affects the cross sectional wealth in-
equality and inter-generational social mobility under the different growth regimes.
This complements the work by Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012), where they
address whether bequests will result in a concentration of wealth in the presence
of envy, and how a central planner can implement a progressive consumption tax
so that agents can internalise the consumption externality introduced through
envy.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is set-up. In
Section 3, the aggregate equilibrium is characterized. In Section 4, the impact
of envy on lineage and cross-sectional dynamics are explored using the Solow
steady state for exposition purposes, and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The model
The basic model combines the household problem in Alvarez-Cuadrado and
Long (2012) with the firms’ problem in Matsuyama (1999). The household




The set-up of the agent’s problem is similar to that in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1.
However, unlike the agents in Chapter 1, agents in this chapter are concerned
about both their absolute as well as the relative consumption among agents in
the same generation. This difference is reflected in the agents’ preference in the
form of an additive specification1 of relative consumption as in Ljungqvist and
Uhlig (2000) and Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012). The choice and implica-
tion of this additive utility form will be discussed later in this chapter.














where γ,η and ξ are parameters of envy, with 0≤ γ,η ,ξ < 1,η = ξγ .







t ≡ yit . (2.2)






Optimal choices of the average agent are2:
st =
β [1+µ(1−ξγ)](1− γ)
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]yt ≡Ω1yt ; (2.4)
1Carroll et al. (2000) explore the use of multiplicative consumption externalities cast within
a CRRA utility, while Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) investigate the existence of economic distor-
tion due to consumption externality using various structural forms of felicity functions such as





(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]yt ; (2.5)
dt+1 =
Rt+1β (1− γ)
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]yt ; (2.6)
bt+1 =
Rt+1βµ(1− γ)(1−ξγ)
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]yt ≡ Rt+1Ω2yt . (2.7)
































(1+µ){(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]} ; (2.12)
φc =
β [(1+µ)(1−ξγ)γ−ξγ(1− γ)]
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] ; (2.13)
φd =
ξγµ (1− γ)β +ξγ(1− γ)− (1−ξγ)γ
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] ; (2.14)
φb =
(1−ξγ)γ+ξγ (1− γ)β
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] . (2.15)
As stated in Alvarez-Caudrado and Long (2012) Proposition 1, the income
elasticities for consumption when young, consumption when old and bequests
3See Appendix B.1.
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Thus, this specification of envy in the utility generates different elasticities for
consumption when young, consumption when old and bequests for each indi-
vidual such that bequest is a luxury good. In addition, as stated in Alvarez-
Caudrado and Long (2012) Proposition 2, the change of income elasticities of



















Thus, this specification of envy in the utility generates income elasticity of sav-
ings and bequests that are dependent on one’s income. This implies that a non-
degenerate distribution of bequest can be obtained even with inelastic labor, and
ex-ante identical agents. Hence, the 2 reasons for adopting this additive con-
sumption externality structure rather than the multiplicative form. Empirically,
using data from PSID, SCF and CES, Dynan et al. (2004) find that savings rate,




The production sector is identical to that described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.
2.3 Equilibrium steady state and dynamics
2.3.1 Derivation of equilibrium capital stock
The market clearing conditions are:
Lt = L =
∫ 1
0




sit di = st ≡ St . (2.20)












From the optimization decision of the average agent, and by substituting
the lifetime resource (B.11), bequest (B.13), and wage (2.21) of the average
agent into his savings, we can obtain an equivalent expression for the aggregate
savings, and the aggregate capital stock of the economy, since we have measure




≡ Ω˜1[bt +wt ]







The unconsumed final goods at time t, will form the available capital stock
for production at time t + 1. Thus by integrating the savings across all young
agents, the aggregate savings in the economy is:






and the capital stock as a function of the final output of the economy can be















= Ω˜1Ω˜3Yt , (2.25)
where Ω˜1 ≡ β [1+µ(1−ξγ)](1−γ)(1−ξγ)+(1−γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] and Ω˜3 ≡
1+σµ(1−ξγ)
σ [1+µ(1−ξγ)] . That is, this econ-
omy saves a constant fraction of its output for the next period.
From the savings accumulation process (2.25), in conjunction with the dy-
namics of innovation (1.21) and the total output (1.23), the unique equilibrium









σ if Kt−1 ≤ θσFNt−1,







This dynamical system can be normalized by the range of intermediate goods
to a 1-dimensional map. Define Φn (k)≡Φ(Φn−1 (k)), Φ1 (k)≡Φ(k), and
kt ≡ KtθσFNt .
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σ if kt−1 ≤ kc = 1,
G˜kt−1
1+θ(kt−1−1) if kt−1 ≥ kc = 1,
(2.27)
where
Φ : R+→ R+4, kt ≡ KtθσFNt , G˜≡ Ω˜1Ω˜3A, Ω˜1 ≡
β (1+µ(1−ξγ))(1−γ)
(1−ξγ)+(1−γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] ,
Ω˜3 ≡ 1+σµ(1−ξγ)σ [1+µ(1−ξγ)] , and A≡ Aˆa ( aLθσF )
1
σ .
The mapping kt = Φ(kt−1) with domain Φ : R+ → R+ in (2.27) is simi-
lar to equation (1.32) in Chapter 1, with changes in the parameter value of G˜.
That is, status anxiety in the form suggested by Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long
(2012), when incorporated into Matsuyama (1999) with idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks and bequest motives, results in corresponding topology and dy-
namics as in Chapter 1. From here, I shall highlight the differences that status
anxiety may bring to the economy compared to the results in Chapter 1, as a
consequence of the change in G˜. Furthermore, compared to Alvarez-Cuadrado
and Long (2012) where the production function is homogenous of degree one
to capital and labor, the results in this chapter include their results for the case
when G˜ < 1, where the economy converges to the Solow steady state. When
G˜ > 1, new insights arising from status anxiety will be discussed.
4k= 0 is excluded from the domain in the mapping kt =Φ(kt−1), as Φ
′
(0)> 1, making k= 0
a repelling fixed point and hence trivial.
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2.3.2 Aggregate steady state and dynamics
Proposition 2.1. The growth potential of the economy is decreasing in the de-
gree of envy γ . However, in the absence of a bequest motive, but the presence of
envy, the growth potential of the economy is increasing in the degree of relative
envy when old, ξ .
Proof. Market clearing (equations (2.21), (2.22) and (2.24)), and the consumer








σ if Kt−1 ≤ θσFNt−1
AKt−1 if Kt−1 ≥ θσFNt−1,
along the balanced growth path, Kt = Ω˜1Ω˜3Yt = Ω˜1Ω˜3AKt−1 = G˜Kt−1, where
























> or≤ 0. Ifµ = 0, ∂ G˜
∂ξ
≥ 0. (2.29)






∂ξ are shown in Ap-
pendix B.2. 
Proposition 2.2. The normalized steady-state capital stock to variety ratio, kt , is
decreasing in the degree of envy γ , in both the regimes. However, in the absence
of a bequest motive, but the presence of envy, the normalized steady-state capital
stock to variety ratio, kt , is increasing in the degree of relative envy when old, ξ .
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Proof. From equation (2.27):
when G˜ < 1, k∗ = (Ω˜1Ω˜3A)σ ≡ G˜σ ;












































































≥ 0 ifµ = 0. (2.33)






∂ξ are shown in Ap-
pendix B.2. 
Comparing with Gershman (2014, Proposition 2), where an increase in envy
increases the aggregate final output in the "Keeping up with the Jones" equilib-
rium, (where τ = 0, that is no destruction of private capital), the results from
Proposition 2.1 and 2.2 differ in that with bequest, growth potential is decreas-
ing with envy, γ; without bequest, growth potential increasing with envy in the
old age, ξ .
In this model, agents save to finance consumption when old (positional), and
for bequest to their immediate offspring (non-positional). An increase in envy,
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denoted by γ , will cause the agents to allocate more of their lifetime resources
to positional goods (consumption when young and old), hence lowering savings
and available aggregate capital stock for innovation.
The savings impact of an increase in the relative importance of envy when
old, ξ , in the presence of bequests, is ambiguous, as positional and non-positional
motives for savings compete. Without bequests, the ambiguity is removed.
The results extend the Proposition 3 from Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012,
pp. 960) to endogenous growth model. Envy not only affects the steady state
normalized capital stock in both Solow and Romer regime, it also determines
on the growth potential of an economy with endogenous growth. Contrastingly,
in Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) where labor is also inelastic, and in Alonso-
Carrera et al. (2008), with pure altruism, where consumption externality extends
beyond agents from the same generation, the steady state capital stock is not af-
fected by consumption externality. Furthermore, in Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long
(2012), there is no long run growth as a consequence of the neoclassical growth
framework.
2.4 Impact of envy on lineage bequest evolution and
distribution
In the following section, I shall highlight the differences that envy might bring
to the evolution of mobility and inequality, as well as a result that is robust
to envy. While I develop the exposition using the case of Solow steady state,
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the following Propositions (2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7) hold correspondingly when
applied to the Romer steady state or the period-2 cycles, given the distributional
equivalence under i.i.d. shocks, as infered from Proposition 1.10, compared to
their respective benchmarks in Chapter 1, without envy, by setting γ = 0.
2.4.1 Lineage bequest evolution
At Solow steady state
At the Solow steady state, k˜∗ = G˜σ < 1. Let Yt+1 = Yt ≡ Y˜ ∗, Rt+1 = Rt ≡ R˜∗,


































































Using the bequest of an agent of lineage i, equation (2.11), the savings of the
average agent, equation (2.4), as a function of the average lifetime resources, as
well as the capital and labor shares, equations (2.21) and (2.22), we derive the
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where φb ≡ (1−ξγ)γ+ξγ(1−γ)β(1−ξγ)+(1−γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] .




















[lit − lt ]. (2.38)
The ratio of bequest to total output inherited by a young agent from lineage i at
any time t, is an autoregressive AR(1) process with a deterministic drift (time


















σ , δ˜1 =
R˜∗βµ
σ(1+β (1+µ)) [1− σφbΩ˜3], and φ˜∗1 = R˜
∗βµ
1+β (1+µ) .
5While not necessary for the characterization of the law of motion for bequests under the
Solow steady state, normalization is needed for the characterization of the Romer steady state
and the period-2 cycles as the total output is growing under the latter 2 trajectories.
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Substituting (2.39) into equation (2.38), we get a detrended autoregressive pro-
cess of order 1, AR(1), for z∗it . That is,
z˜∗it+1− φ˜∗1 z˜∗it = [lit − lt ]≡ uit+1 ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2l ). (2.40)
Proposition 2.3. Since |φ˜∗1 | ≡ | R˜
∗βµ
1+β (1+µ) |< 1, z˜∗it+1 is a covariance-stationary6
AR(1) process.
(i) The expected bequest inherited by a young agent of lineage i, as a ratio of










(ii) The variance of bequest inherited by a young agent of lineage i, as a ratio












(iii) The intergenerational mobility can be measured by the covariance or the
correlation coefficient, to gauge the extent of intergenerational transmis-
































6See Chapter 1 Definitions 1.1 and 1.2, or Hamilton (1994, pp.45–46) for the definition of
stationarity, strict stationarity and covariance (weak) stationarity.
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Proof. As in Chapter 1, Proposition 1.5. 
Proposition 2.4. The higher the envy, γ , the higher the correlation of the ratio
of bequests to total output across generations from the same dynasty, the lower
the intergenerational mobility.

















































The algebraic manipulations to sign ∂ Ω˜1∂γ , and
∂ Ω˜3
∂γ are shown in Appendix B.2.

Although Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012) derived the the intergenera-
tional correlation in terms of the returns of capital and bequest motives, this
comparative statics, absent in Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012), adds a new
dimension to the intergenerational mobility results discussed in Chapter 1. Specif-
ically, the higher the envy, the lower the intergenerational mobility. The intro-
duction of envy creates a distribution in agents’ propensity to save, with the
poorer agents spending a greater fraction of their lifetime resources on posi-
tional goods, hence reducing the mobility of their lineage.
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Proposition 2.5. The higher the price elasticity of the final goods sector’s de-
mand for each intermediate, σ (and correspondingly, higher capital share, lower
wage share, as well as lower monopoly margin for innovation), the higher the
correlation of the ratio of bequests to total output across generations from the
same dynasty, the lower the intergenerational mobility.
Proof. From the correlation equation of Proposition 2.3,




































Thus, the increase intergenerational mobility as a result of an increase in
wage share, as in Chapter 1, is robust to the envy specification here. Again, this
result is new relative to Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012).
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2.4.2 Cross-sectional distributions
At Solow steady state
Proposition 2.6. Assuming |φ˜∗1 | < 1 and σφbΩ˜3 < 1, the cross sectional in-
equality of the ratio of bequests to total output is more than (less than) the cross




> (<)(1−σφbΩ˜3)2. In the absence of
envy, that is, γ = 0, the cross sectional inequality the ratio of bequests to total
output is less than the cross sectional inequality of wages.
Proof. From the asymptotic distribution for a covariance-stationary process, the
inequality of bequests and labor income in the asymptotic cross sectional distri-



























































Unlike in Chapter 1, in the presence of envy, bequests can become a source
of wealth concentration. The risk pooling effect of intergenerational transfers is
diminished with positional concerns, as the rich has a higher propensity to save.
7The coefficient of variation, as a measure of inequality, is scale invariant.
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Thus, in contrast to Chapter 1, the inequality of inherited wealth could be higher
than the inequality of the wage income with status anxiety.
Proposition 2.7.
(i) If envy γ > 0, the relative inequality of bequest, capital holdings, consump-








(ii) The differences in relative inequality of bequest, capital holdings, con-
sumption when old and young are identical under both the Solow regime
and the Romer regime.
(iii) In the absence of envy, that is, if envy γ = 0, the relative inequality of
bequest, capital holdings, consumption when old and young are:
CV [bit+1] =CV [s
i





where at steady state, CV [wi]≥CV [bi] =CV [si] =CV [di] =CV [ci] (from
Proposition 1.6).
Proof. Using the optimization equations of agent i, (2.8), (2.9), (2.10), (2.11),
the first period budget constraint (B.7), and the assumption of Cov[wit ,b
i








t ≡ yit .
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≤ φb = (1−ξγ)γ+ξγ (1− γ)β
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] ×
1+µ
1+µ




≥ φd = ξγµ (1− γ)β +ξγ(1− γ)− (1−ξγ)γ
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]
≥ 0⇒ (1+φc)≥ (1+φd)≥ (1−φs)≥ (1−φb). (2.67)
Part (ii) follows from Proposition 1.8. 
This strengthens the applicability of the "stable steady state" results from
Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012, pp. 962–964) on the relative inequality of
bequest, capital holdings, consumption when old and young, in which there is
no long-run growth under the neoclassical framework, to include Matsuyama
(1999)’s production function with endogenous growth through innovation and
cycles, where the fixed points are not unique. Specifically, even though as shown
in Matsuyama (1999), the aggregate growth over period-2 cycles are higher than
at either of the steady states, with i.i.d. shocks, the lineage wealth dynamics
and cross-sectional wealth distributions for Solow and Romer steady states, and
period-2 cycles are identical as in Chapter 1, despite the presence of "Status
Anxiety". As discussed in Section 1.4.3, under i.i.d. productivity shocks, the
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global lineage evolution of inherited wealth to output ratio, as well as the long-
run cross-sectional distribution of inherited wealth to output ratio in the presence
of "Status Anxiety" have been characterized in this thesis, including chaotic tra-
jectories, not just at the steady state(s). Compared to Alvarez-Cuadrado and
Long (2012), besides introducing long-run growth through innovation, incorpo-
rating the production function of Matsuyama (1999) enables one to study the
effect of price elasticity of the final goods sector’s demand for each intermedi-
ate on intergenerational lineage mobility. As in Chapter 1, the higher the price
elasticity of the final goods sector’s demand for each intermediate, the lower the
intergenerational lineage mobility as shown in Proposition 2.5.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter shows that status anxiety can affect both the aggregate bequest
and lineage bequest evolution of an economy. Status anxiety can decrease the
steady state ratio of capital stock to variety of intermediate goods in an endoge-
nous growth model with innovation and fixed cost of innovation. Furthermore,
status anxiety can affect the nature of the steady state (Solow or Romer) of the
economy, and hence its growth potential.
On the distributional front, an increase in status anxiety decreases intergen-
erational mobility as agents shift resources to positional goods, reducing the
allocation to non-positional goods such as bequest. On a cross-sectional front,
the presence of status anxiety can result in the inequality of wealth being more
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than or less than that of wage. This contrasts with Chapter 1, where in the ab-
sence of status anxiety, the cross-sectional inequality of wealth is always less
than that of wages.
Thus, envy is not only a factor that reduces the intergenerational risk pool-
ing through bequest, resulting in a higher concentration of inherited wealth; it
is also a factor that drives the relative distributions of household consumption
when young and old, savings and bequests through the nature of the expendi-




Endogenous labor supply and its
impact on mobility, inequality and
growth trajectories
3.1 Introduction
Theoretically, inheritance creates a disincentive to labor due to the marginal
utility of wealth, with leisure being a normal good. The magnitude of this dis-
incentive affects the relative importance of inheritance and life-cycle savings on
total wealth of a country, as well as the evolution of relative inequality between
inheritance and lifetime income (from earnings and inheritance). Using EITM
(Estate-Income Tax Match) and PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) data
respectively, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) and Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) find a
negative relationship between labor force participation and size of inheritance
for the US. In addition, Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) also find that the impact
of inheritance on hours worked from prime-age worker is statistically signifi-
cant, but small. This concurs with the findings of Halvorsen et al. (2012), using
a panel data that covers all registered inheritances in Norway, with women be-
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ing more responsive than men. Moreover, Halvorsen et al. (2012) also note
that young inheritors respond via the intensive margin more than the extensive
margin, while older inheritors do the reverse.
In this chapter, I explore the aggregate and distributional implications of
endogenous labor supply, in the presence of bequests and idiosyncratic labor
productivity shocks, within an endogenous growth framework. This is related
to the literature of incomplete markets by Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1997),
where infinitely-lived agents, with inelastic labor, are subjected to idiosyncratic
labor productivity shocks, with limited ability to insure against the income risk.
This financial friction results in an increase demand for savings for precaution-
ary motive, and consequently, capital and output are higher. By introducing en-
dogenous labor-leisure choice into an incomplete market model with infinitely
lived agents, Marcet et al. (2007) study the capital accumulation with 2-state
Markov chain in labor productivity, and show that ex post wealth effect reduces
labor supply, offsetting the effects of precautionary savings. Zhu (2013b) gen-
eralize that result to cover multiple-state Markov chain as well as more general
utility functions. Using a simple OLG model with "warm glow" bequest motive
and a log-linear preference for leisure, I study the wealth effect on aggregate
labor supply in the presence of uninsurable labor-income risk, and the general
equilibrium effect on wage per unit efficient labor analytically. One can interpret
the idiosyncratic productivity risk as any inputs that complements with capital,
such as heterogenous technology adoption, entrepreneurship or human capital.
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The analytical simplification is done by abstracting away the intertemporal ef-
fect of consumption-savings choice, retaining only the intratemporal effect, by
using the log-linear assumption for the preference of leisure in conjunction with
2-period lived agents in an OLG structure: to link labor effort to contemporane-
ous average wage, contemporaneous idiosyncratic productivity, and contempo-
raneous idiosyncratic inherited wealth.
By using a production function with innovation and fixed cost (Matsuyama
(1999)) instead of the neoclassical production used in the previous literature,
there are a few new findings at the aggregate level. In addition, by using covariance-
stationarity, I characterize the changes in lineage mobility and cross-sectional
inequality of wealth that result from elastic labor over different growth regimes
including period-2 cycles. For the aggregate supply of labor, the higher the price
elasticity of the final goods sector’s demand for each intermediate (and corre-
spondingly, the higher the capital share, the lower the wage share, as well as
lower monopoly margin for innovator), the lower the aggregate labor supply at
equilibrium. Furthermore, if the labor share is relatively small, an increase in
bequest motive will reduce the aggregate labor (wealth effect dominates), which
is consistent with Marcet et al. (2007) and Zhu (2013b). However, if the labor
share is relatively large, an increase in the bequest motive will result in a higher
aggregate labor supply (precautionary savings for uninsurable labor risk domi-
nates), as with Aiyagari (1994). Still on the aggregate front, the growth potential
of the economy, and steady state normalized capital stock is decreasing with the
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preference for leisure. On the lineage bequest evolution, the higher the pref-
erence for leisure, the higher the intergenerational mobility as the elastic labor
provides a channel to level the playing field of the asset-poor via the disincentive
to work among the asset-rich. On the cross-sectional distribution, the higher the
preference for leisure, the higher the cross-sectional inequality of bequest. Un-
der period-2 growth cycles, the inequality of leisure consumed at both period-2
fixed points are identical, but are higher compared to the steady state inequality
of leisure consumption, as the alternating growth regimes induce correlations
with endogenous labor-leisure choice. Finally, the higher the price elasticity of
the final goods sector’s demand for each intermediate (and correspondingly, the
higher the capital share, the lower the wage share, as well as lower monopoly
margin for innovator), the higher the cross-sectional inequality of the ratio of
wage income earned to total output.
This work complements a related thread of literature, where unlike the agents
in this chapter, in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2007) and García-Peñalosa
and Turnovsky (2011), the infinitely-lived agents have identical labor produc-
tivity, but ex-ante heterogeneous endowments of physical capital. In García-
Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2007), economy-wide capital stock exerts an external-
ity such that the aggregate output is essentially AK in form, and each agent’s
labor supply is linear in his capital endowment. Hence income inequality is
determined by the initial distribution of capital among the agents and the ag-
gregate labor supply at equilibrium. There is no income dynamics, and faster
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growth results in more unequal income distribution. In García-Peñalosa and
Turnovsky (2011), with a neoclassical growth model, the wealth distribution
dynamics are similar under both elastic and inelastic labor, while the income
distribution varies as poorer agents supply more labor.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the model. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes the aggregate equilibrium, and studies the impact of model’s
primitive on aggregate labor supply. Section 4 analyzes the impact of elastic la-




Time is discrete. The economy consists of overlapping generations of agents
who live for 2 periods: the young period, and the old period. In each generation,
there is a continuum of measure 1 of agents. In each family i, old agent gives
birth to 1 child, keeping the population in the economy constant1. When old,
agents retire, consume their savings, and leave a bequest to their child. When
young, agents choose the proportion of time endowment spent between work
and leisure; consume, and save.
Young agents within a given generation, t, are heterogenous in 2 aspects:
their idiosyncratic productivity, lit , and the inherited bequest b
i
t . I assume that
1Population changes can easily be incorporated by changing the measure of agents in each
generation to nt , instead of 1.
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the labor productivity is drawn from an independent and identical distribution
on a positive support, with an expectation, E[lit ] = l¯ ≡ 1, and a finite variance,
Var[lit ] = σ2l , across agents from the same generation, and independent across
time, that is, independent across generations from the same lineage. The prob-














)≡ lncit +λ lnΛit +β [lndit+1+µ lnbit+1] (3.1)






t [1−Λit ]≡ yit , (3.2)





where cit is the consumption when young, and d
i
t+1 is the consumption when
old, respectively, of an agent born at time t; bit+1 is the bequest left by an agent
born at time, t, when old, to his immediate offspring born at time t; β < 1 is
the subjective discount factor; 0 ≤ µ,λ < 1 are the importance of bequest and
leisure motives respectively; Λit is the fraction of time spend on leisure by young;
lit ∼ i.i.d.(1,σ2l ); wit =wt lit ; wt is the equilibrium wage rate for each unit of labor
productivity; sit is the amount saved when young; y
i
t is the lifetime resource of
an individual i for agent i, born at time t; and Rt+1 is the equilibrium gross rate
of return on capital at time t+1.
At time t+1, an old agent maximizes his second period utility, defined as:
V ≡ lndit+1+µ lnbit+1, (3.4)
by choosing his second period consumption and bequest for his immediate off-
spring, given his second period budget constraint. Substituting (3.3) into (3.4),
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and differentiating the latter with respect to dit+1 for the first order condition, the






















At time t, subject to the first period budget constraint, the young agent chooses








Substituting (3.2) and (3.7) into (3.8), and differentiating the latter with respect
to sit for the first order condition:
1





which implies that the optimal savings for agent i as a function of his lifetime
resource is a constant fraction, as with Bossmann et al. (2007).
sit =






Substituting (3.2) and (3.7) into (3.8), and differentiating the latter with re-
spect to Λit for the first order condition:
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wt lit





The right hand side of (3.11) is the marginal benefit of leisure, while the left
hand side is the quality(wealth) adjusted marginal cost of leisure. Substituting
the optimal savings equation (3.10) into (3.11), we get the optimal amount of










That is, the optimal amount of leisure to consume for an individual of lineage
i is directly proportional to the size of the inherited wealth, but inversely pro-
portional to the idiosyncratic labor productivity draw and the wage rate per unit
productivity (i.e. the opportunity costs of leisure). This helps to explain why
even for the very rich, such as Bill Gates and Warren Buffet2, they may continue
to work despite their wealth and age, as their labor productivities are uttermost.
From equation (3.12), each agent’s sensitivity of individual labor supply to
relative wealth differs, by virtue of the idiosyncratic labor productivity draws,
unlike in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2011), where the sensitivity of indi-
vidual labor supply to relative capital, which depends on the aggregate leisure, is
thus identical for all agents. This is because in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky
(2011), agents are endowed with only heterogenous capital ex-ante, but the op-
2Ranked by Forbes (2015, March 2) as the World’s richest person for the past 21 years and
World’s third richest respectively.
Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2015/03/02/forbes-billionaires-full-
list-of-the-500-richest-people-in-the-world-2015/, on May 1, 2015.
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portunity cost per unit of leisure are identical with no idiosyncratic labor produc-
tivity shocks. As a result, each infinitely-lived agent operating in the neoclassi-
cal growth model in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2011) will have a steady-
state relative wealth, and the higher the steady state relative wealth, the more
leisure he consumes, equalizing the impact of wealth inequality on the distribu-
tion of income. Contrastingly, in this chapter, there is no steady-state relative
wealth for the OLG agents of each lineage i, as a result of the idiosyncratic labor
productivity draws, but there exists a law of motion of inherited wealth to total
output of the economy to characterize the wealth dynamics of the lineage. Addi-
tionally, the evolution of the distribution of inherited wealth and the distribution
of maximum idiosyncratic labor income that could be earned by an agent of lin-
eage i, drive the distribution of leisure together. Besides, with the possibility of
different growth regimes, as well as period-2 cycles, as a result of the production
function with innovation and fixed cost introduced by Matsuyama (1999), dif-
ferent aggregate wage rate per efficient labor can be generated, which introduces
differences in the asymptotic cross-sectional distribution of wealth between the
steady-states and the fixed points of period-2 cycles, as will be shown in Section
3.4.2.
Note that with the choice of log preference for leisure for analytical tractabil-
ity, this model can only be used to analyze the intensive margin of labor supply,
and is silent on the extensive margin and related issues such as unemployment
and retirement decisions.
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yt ≡ Rt+1Ω2yt . (3.21)
With the log-linear preference for leisure and the 2-period OLG structure, it
does not change the intertemporal optimization, thus the optimal choices of an
agent i correspond to those in Chapter 1 with inelastic labor, as agents continue
to save the same fixed proportion of their lifetime resources for consumption at
old age and bequest. By eliminating the intertemporal substitution effect, the
labor effort is driven by the wealth effect relative to the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks. This chapter thus focuses on the idiosyncratic change in labor
effort arising from the contemporaneous heterogeneous productivity shocks and
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the heterogenous wealth endowment, that accumulates from the transmission
of past idiosyncratic productivity shocks and labor choices from agents of the
same lineage. Overall, the endogenous labor-leisure choice has a scaling effect
by changing the quantum of lifetime resources available for the young. Further-
more, it changes the coefficient and drift in the first order difference equation
governing the accumulation of intergenerational transfer of wealth through be-
quest as will be discussed in the subsequent section.
3.2.2 Firms’ optimization
The production sector is similar to that described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2,
except that aggregate labor, L, is replaced by an elastic aggregate labor supply
Lt , where Lt =
∫ 1










3.3 Equilibrium steady state and dynamics
3.3.1 Derivation of equilibrium capital stock








sit di = st ≡ St . (3.24)









and the wage share of the economy is:
1
σ

















































disutility from working with increase in bequest
 .
(3.27)
Combining the average inheritance and savings equations, (3.21) and (3.18),












Substituting the wage share (3.26) and the average inheritance (3.21), in the
aggregate effective labor supply (3.27), we get:






















⇒ Lt = [1+β (1+µ)](1+µ)
[1+β (1+µ)+λ ](1+µ)+λµ(σ −1)




Due to the log-linear formulation of the preference for leisure and OLG
framework, the aggregate labor and leisure are constant. Since we have measure
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1 of agents in each generation, we can obtain an equivalent expression for the
aggregate savings, and the aggregate capital stock, of the economy from the













The unconsumed final goods at time t, will form the available capital stock
for production at time t + 1. Thus by integrating the savings across all young
agents, the aggregate savings in the economy is:






and the capital stock as a function of the final output of the economy can be
















where Ω1 ≡ β (1+µ)1+β (1+µ) and Ω3 ≡ 1+σµσ(1+µ) . That is, this economy saves a constant
fraction of its output for the next period.
From the savings accumulation process (3.32), in conjunction with the dy-
namics of innovation (1.21) and the total output (1.23) (in Chapter 1, replacing
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the L with the elastic labor supply L, the unique equilibrium path for any initial









σ if Kt−1 ≤ θσFNt−1,








This dynamical system can be normalized by the range of intermediate goods
to a 1-dimensional map. Define Φn (k)≡Φ(Φn−1 (k)), Φ1 (k)≡Φ(k), and
kt ≡ KtθσFNt .





σ if kt−1 ≤ kc = 1,
Gkt−1
1+θ(kt−1−1) if kt−1 ≥ kc = 1,
(3.34)
where:
Φ : R+→ R+3, kt ≡ KtθσFNt , G ≡ Ω1Ω3A, Ω1 ≡
β (1+µ)
1+β (1+µ) , Ω3 ≡ 1+σµσ(1+µ) , and
A ≡ Aˆa ( aLθσF )
1
σ . The aggregate dynamics is thus similar to Chapter 1, except
for the scaling of the output due to the introduction of a log-linear leisure-labor
choice, where L≤ 1.
The mapping kt =Φ(kt−1) with domain Φ :R+→R+ in (3.34) has a unique
steady state where kt ≡ KtθσFNt is constant over time. Denote the fixed point as k∗
such that k∗=Φ(k∗) if k∗< kc≡ 1 and k∗∗ such that k∗∗=Φ(k∗∗) if k∗∗> kc≡ 1.
3k= 0 is excluded from the domain in the mapping kt =Φ(kt−1), as Φ
′
(0)> 1, making k= 0
a repelling fixed point and hence trivial.
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3.3.2 Comparative statics of equilibrium aggregate labor sup-
ply
As labor enters into the final goods production in the form of a Cobb-Douglas
technology in equation (3.22), the higher the aggregate labor supply, the lower
the equilibrium wage per unit of effective labor, keeping the factor share con-
stant. Furthermore, from equation (3.32), it can be seen that the higher the







Proposition 3.1. The equilibrium aggregate labor supply, L, is constant, and it
is determined by the primitives of the model as follows:
(i) The higher the taste for leisure, λ , the lower the aggregate labor supply at
equilibrium, L.
(ii) The higher the price elasticity of the final goods sector’s demand for each
intermediate, σ (and correspondingly, higher capital share, lower wage
share, as well as lower monopoly margin of innovator), lower the aggre-
gate labor supply at equilibrium, L.
(iii) The higher subjective discount factor, β , the higher the aggregate labor
supply at equilibrium, L.
(iv) If σ ≤ (>)1+2β (1+µ)1+β (1−µ) , the higher the bequest motive, µ , the higher (lower)
the aggregate labor supply at equilibrium, L.
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Proof. From (3.29):



























[1+λ +µ+λµσ +β (1+µ)2]2
×{[
1+λ +µ+λµσ +β (1+µ)2
]
















1+λ +µ+λµσ +β (1+µ)2
]
− [1+µ+β (1+µ)2 [1+2β (1+µ)+λσ ]}
=
1
[1+λ +µ+λµσ +β (1+µ)2]2
×{λ [1−σ +β (1+µ) [2+(µ−1)σ ]]}Q 0,






The results from Proposition 3.1(i) and (iii) follow from the log-linear pref-
erence for leisure and OLG structure assumed.
From Proposition 3.1(ii), the higher the price elasticity of the final goods
sector’s demand for each intermediate (and correspondingly, the higher the cap-
ital share, the lower the wage share, as well as lower monopoly margin for
innovator), the lower the aggregate labor supply at equilibrium. The driver of
this result is the Cobb-Douglas assumption of the final good sector, where labor
and intermediate goods are the factor inputs.
From Proposition 3.1(iv), it can be seen that the wealth effect of bequest on
aggregate labor supply is related to the price elasticity, σ (and correspondingly,
capital share, as well as the monopoly margin of innovator). If the capital share
is small enough relative to the labor share, an increase in bequest motive will
encourage the agent with average wealth to work more, since he gets a relatively
bigger slice from the output gains due to his diligence, and a higher aggregate la-
bor supply results (precautionary savings for uninsurable labor risk dominates),
as with Aiyagari (1994). Conversely, if the labor share is relatively small, an
increase in bequest motive will reduce the aggregate labor (wealth effect domi-
nates), which is consistent with Marcet et al. (2007) and Zhu (2013b).
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3.3.3 Aggregate steady state and dynamics
Proposition 3.2. The growth potential of the economy is decreasing in the de-
gree of leisure, λ .
Proof. Market clearing (equations (3.26), (3.25), and the consumer optimiza-








σ if Kt−1 ≤ θσFNt−1
AKt−1 if Kt−1 ≥ θσFNt−1,
along the balanced growth path, Kt = Ω1Ω3Yt = Ω1Ω3AKt−1 = GKt−1, where























Proposition 3.3. The normalized steady-state capital stock to variety ratio, kt ,
is decreasing in the preference for leisure, λ , in both the regimes.
Proof. From equation (3.34):
when G < 1, k∗ = (Ω1Ω2A)σ ≡ Gσ ;

































In this model, agents work to finance consumption when young and old,
and for bequest to their immediate offspring. An increase in the preference for
leisure, denoted by λ , will cause the agents to allocate less of their time on work,
hence lowering savings and available aggregate capital stock for innovation.
Thus, unlike neoclassical growth models, both the normalized steady state
capital stock and growth potential of the economy are affected by the preference
for leisure, creating greater leeway for policy engagement through labor income
tax or subsidies. The results extend the findings from Bossmann et al. (2007,
Appendix B.2. pp. 1268-1269) to endogenous growth models.
3.4 Impact of leisure on lineage bequest evolution
and distribution
In the following section, I shall highlight the differences that the endogenous
labor-leisure choice might bring to the evolution of mobility and inequality,
compared to their respective benchmarks in Chapter 1, with inelastic labor, by
setting λ = 0.
While I develop the following exposition using the steady states, the results
are applicable to the fixed points of period-2 cycles, given the distributional
equivalence under i.i.d. shocks, as infered from Proposition 1.10.
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3.4.1 Lineage bequest evolution
From the capital share at equilibrium, equation (3.25), the savings rate, equation


















where Gt denotes the gross output growth rate at time t. Using the bequest of
an agent of lineage i, equation (3.16), as well as the capital and labor shares,
equations (3.25) and (3.26), and aggregate labor, equation (3.29), we derive the















































































[lit − lt ],
4While not necessary for the characterization of the law of motion for bequests under the
Solow steady state, normalization is needed for the characterization of the Romer steady state
and the period-2 cycles as the total output is growing under the latter 2 trajectories. Normaliza-

































[lit − lt ]. (3.44)
The ratio of bequest to total output inherited by a young agent from lineage
i at any time t, with elastic labor, is a first order non-homogenous difference
equation.
































. Substituting (3.45) into equation (3.44), we get a first
order homogenous difference equation for zEit+1 . That is,
zEit+1−φE1 zEit = [lit − lt ]≡ uit+1 ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2l ). (3.46)
Proposition 3.4. Since
∣∣φE1 ∣∣≡ ∣∣∣∣ (1− 1σ )βµΩ1Ω3 [ 11+β (1+µ)+λ ]
∣∣∣∣< 1, zEit+1 is a covariance-
stationary AR(1) process.
(i) The expected bequest inherited by a young agent of lineage i, as a ratio of
















(ii) The variance of bequest inherited by a young agent of lineage i, as a ratio
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(iii) The intergenerational mobility can be measured by the covariance or the
correlation coefficient, to gauge the extent of intergenerational transmis-








































































= γ j = φE j1 γ0 =
φE jσ2l
1−φE21







Proposition 3.5. The higher the preference for leisure, λ , the lower the corre-
lation of the ratio of bequests to total output across generations from the same
dynasty, the higher the intergenerational mobility.





















The higher the preference for leisure, the higher the intergenerational mobil-
ity as the elastic labor provides a channel to level the playing field of the asset-
poor via the disincentive to work among the asset-rich. That is, with endogenous
labor, wealth effect from inheritance discourages labor. Hence bequest has an
indirect effect on mobility via the marginal value of hours worked, besides the
direct effect via intergenerational risk pooling. This impact of leisure on lineage
mobility heterogenous wealth has not been discussed in the existing heteroge-
neous agent literature because the models do not cover elastic labor (as with
Wan and Zhu (2012)), and/or because the models do not explicitly characterize
the lineage bequest evolution with elastic labor, (as with Bossmann et al. (2007),
Zhu (2013b), and Marcet et al. (2007)).
Proposition 3.6. With endogenous labor, the higher the price elasticity of the
final sector’s demand for each intermediate, σ (and correspondingly, higher
capital share, lower wage share, as well as lower monopoly margin for innova-
tion), the higher the correlation of the ratio of bequests to total output across





















Proposition 3.7. With endogenous labor, the higher the bequest motive, µ , the
higher the correlation of the ratio of bequests to total output across generations






















It can be seen from Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 that the results relating to com-
parative statics of the lineage bequest evolution in Chapter 1 (Propositions 1.78
and 1.76) are robust to the introduction of endogenous labor-leisure choice. In
this model, the returns on capital across all agents who saved are homogenous
and thus rank preserving, although it can vary across time. Thus mobility is
driven by the idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks. A decrease in wage share
will decrease intergenerational mobility. With the "joy-of-giving" bequest mo-
tive, an increase in bequest motive reduces intergenerational mobility under i.i.d.
labor productivity shocks. That is, bequest functions as an intergenerational risk
pooling device for idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks within a lineage, off-




Cross-sectional distribution of bequest
Proposition 3.8. The cross -sectional inequality of bequest with elastic labor is
higher than that with inelastic labor. The higher the preference for leisure, the
higher the cross-sectional inequality of bequest.







≤ (σ−1)µ1+σµ = φ∗1 < 1. From the
asymptotic distribution for a covariance-stationary process5, the inequality of
bequests and labor income in the asymptotic cross-sectional distribution using
























































5See Hamilton (1994, pp. 186–195: Section 7.2. Limit Theorems for Serially Dependent
Observations).
6The coefficient of variation, as a measure of inequality, is scale invariant.
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With endogenous labor, cross-sectional variation of inherited wealth gener-
ates cross-sectional variation of labor-leisure choice, in addition to the baseline
idiosyncratic variation of labor productivity. Hence bequest has an indirect ef-
fect on cross-sectional inequality via the marginal value of work arising from
wealth effect.
Proposition 3.9. With endogenous labor, as with inelastic labor, the higher
price elasticity of the final goods sector’s demand for each intermediate, σ ,
(and correspondingly, an increase in capital share, a decrease in wage share,
as well as a decrease in monopoly margin for innovation), the higher the cross-











































Proposition 3.10. With endogenous labor, as with inelastic labor, the higher the










































It can be seen from Propositions 3.9 and 3.10 that the results relating to com-
parative statics of the cross-sectional wealth inequality in Chapter 1 (Proposi-
tions 1.78 and 1.76) are robust to the introduction of endogenous labor-leisure
choice. In this model, the returns on capital across all agents who saved are
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homogenous and thus rank preserving, although it can vary across time. As a
result of the Cobb-Douglas production function in the final good sector, a de-
crease in wage share will decrease cross-sectional wealth inequality. Thus the
higher the price elasticity of the final sector’s demand for each intermediate, the
lower the monopoly margin for innovation, the lower the wage share, the lower
the cross-sectional bequest inequality. With the "joy-of-giving" bequest motive,
an increase in bequest motive reduces the cross-sectional inequality of inher-
ited wealth under i.i.d. labor productivity shocks. That is, bequest functions
as a intergenerational risk pooling device for idiosyncratic labor productivity
shocks. This extends the robustness of role of bequest in intergenerational risk
sharing by Becker and Tomes (1979) and Bossmann et al. (2007) to a model of
endogenous growth (with innovation and cycles) with inelastic and elastic labor,
in Chapter 1 and 3 respectively.
Cross-sectional distribution of leisure and wage income earned












































































Leisure consumed by an agent i, being a ratio of 2 random variables: contempo-
raneous idiosyncratic inherited wealth, bit , and idiosyncratic labor productivity





have distributions with support [0,∞) (see Stuart and Ord (1994, pp. 351)).
Proposition 3.11.
(i) If G = Ω1Ω3A < 1 or G = Ω1Ω3A > θ − 1, for i.i.d. labor productivity
shocks, the inequality of leisure consumed, measured by the coefficient of
variation, are identical under either the Solow or Romer steady state.
(ii) If 1<G=Ω1Ω3A< θ−1, under period-2 cycles exists, and the inequality
of leisure consumed at both period-2 fixed points are identical, but are
higher compared to the steady states inequality of leisure consumption in
part (i).
Proof. By applying Propositions 1.1 and 1.10 to the moments of Λit in equations
(3.60) and (3.61). 
From equation (3.12), each agent’s sensitivity of individual labor supply to
relative wealth differs, due to the idiosyncratic labor productivity draws. The
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distribution of hours worked is determined by the joint evolution of the distri-
bution of inherited wealth and the distribution of maximum idiosyncratic labor
income that could be earned by an agent of lineage i. Different aggregate wage
rate per efficient labor over the different steady states and the fixed points of
the period-2 cycles are generated. Therefore, under period-2 growth cycles, the
inequality of leisure consumed at both period-2 fixed points are identical, but
are higher compared to the steady state inequality of leisure consumption, as
the alternating aggregate wage rate per efficient labor over growth regimes in-
creases the variability of the cross-sectional distribution of leisure consumed.
Thus, extending the prior studies on the distributional implications of endoge-
nous labor-leisure choice, this chapter covers both the AK growth model (as
in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2007)) and the neoclassical growth model
(as in García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2011)), as well as period-2 cycle, which
is novel. However, diverging from García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2007) and
García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2011) where agents are endowed with ex-ante
heterogenous amount of capital, agents in this chapter can be ex-ante identical
in wealth. The lineage bequest evolution and mobility, as well as the cross-
sectional inequality of the distributions of wealth, leisure consumed and wage-
income are engendered by the idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks (absent in
the other two papers) and the magnitude of the motives for bequest and leisure.
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The cross-sectional expectation and variance of wages earned of an agent i from

























































































































) } . (3.65)
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Proposition 3.12. With endogenous labor, the cross-sectional inequality of the
ratio of wage income earned to total output may be increasing or decreasing





















































































































































With an increase in the preference for leisure, the general equilibrium wage
share effect (price effect from equilibrium wages) on the cross-sectional inequal-
ity of labor earnings is positive, but the substitution and wealth effects (quantity
effect from hours worked) on the cross-sectional inequality of labor earnings are
negative.
Proposition 3.13. With endogenous labor, the higher price elasticity of the fi-
nal goods sector’s demand for each intermediate, σ , (and correspondingly, an
increase in capital share, a decrease in wage share, as well as a decrease in
monopoly margin for innovation), the higher the the cross-sectional inequality



































































































































From equation (3.74) and (3.77), when the price elasticity increases, the
wealth effect will lead to an increase in the inequality of wage income earned
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due to the increase in cross-sectional inequality from inherited wealth; further-
more, from equation (3.74) and (3.76), there is a general equilibrium effect that
increases the wage share, through the increase in the value of per unit effective
labor intensifying the inequality of labor productivity endowment. Thus, the
inequality of wage income to output ratio increases with an increase in price
elasticity, σ (and correspondingly, an increase in capital share, a decrease in
wage share, as well as a decrease in monopoly margin for innovation), in the
presence of elastic labor.
Proposition 3.14. With endogenous labor, the cross-sectional inequality of the
ratio of wage income earned to total output may be increasing or decreasing


























































































S0 from (3.38)︸ ︷︷ ︸
S0
, (3.82)






























































As stated in Proposition 3.1(iv), the wealth effect of bequest on aggregate
labor supply is related to the price elasticity, σ (and correspondingly, capital
share, as well as the monopoly margin of innovator). If the capital share is
small enough relative to the labor share, an increase in bequest motive will lead
to a higher aggregate labor supply results (precautionary savings for uninsur-
able labor risk dominates), as with Aiyagari (1994), therefore a negative general
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equilibrium wage effect (price effect) on the cross-sectional inequality of wage
income. Conversely, if the labor share is relatively small, an increase in bequest
motive will reduce the aggregate labor (wealth effect dominates), which is con-
sistent with Marcet et al. (2007) and Zhu (2013b). The substitution effect of an
increase in bequest motive on the cross-sectional inequality of wage income is
positive due to an increase in the hours worked (quantity effect) for all agents
(converging to the inelastic labor case). However, the wealth effect of an in-
crease in bequest motive on the cross-sectional inequality of wage income is
ambiguous as impact on the hours worked (quantity effect) is unclear, due to the
heterogeneity of the wealth inherited and the heterogeneity of the indiosyncratic
labor productivity draw. If the preference for leisure, λ , is sufficiently low, and
the wage share, 1σ , is sufficiently high, an increase in the bequest motive could
increase the cross-sectional inequality of wage income to output ratio, in the
presence of elastic labor.
3.5 Conclusion
In the presence of bequest motive, the wealth effect of inheritance brings about
greater heterogeneity in the endogenous consumption of leisure, especially over
endogenous growth cycles, when measured in terms of coefficient of variation.
The comparative statics of the lineage mobility and cross-sectional inequality of
the ratio of inherited wealth to output for inelastic labor under i.i.d. idiosyncratic
shocks to changes in the bequest motive and price elasticity of the final sector’s
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demand for each intermediate (and correspondingly, higher capital share, lower
wage share, as well as lower monopoly margin for innovation), remain robust
even when labor-leisure choice is made endogenously. This extends the robust-
ness of role of bequest in intergenerational risk sharing by Becker and Tomes
(1979) and Bossmann et al. (2007) to a model of endogenous growth (with in-
novation and cycles) with both inelastic and elastic labor.
However, with elastic labor, in the presence of a bequest motive, the cross-
sectional inequality of the ratio of wages earned to final output is no longer iden-
tical to the inequality of the idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks as in Chap-
ters 1 and 2. The comparative statics on cross-sectional ratio of wages earned to
final output are driven by the relative size of the general equilibrium effect of the
wages, the contemporaneous substitution effect of consumption to leisure and
the inherited wealth effect, adjusted for quality with the contemporaneous labor
productivity shock, on demand for leisure. Further theoretical research could
be informed and directed by empirical evidence, through the merging of micro-
datasets individual consumption, labor, savings and inheritances registered.
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Chapter 4
Fiscal policies and their impact on
mobility, inequality and growth
trajectories
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I consider the impact of fiscal policies on inequality and mobility.
With logarithmic utility, a decrease in inheritance tax increases cross-sectional
inequality, tilting the playing field, under i.i.d. and correlated labor productivity
shocks, for both Solow and Romer regimes as well as for period-2 cycles, thus
strengthening the results from Bossmann et al. (2007), while contrasting with
Becker and Tomes (1979), Atkinson (1980) and Davies (1986). Furthermore,
an increase in inheritance tax also increases intergenerational lineage mobility
under i.i.d. shocks. On the other hand, the reduction of volatility of growth by
fiscal policies such as the innovation subsidy policy rule proposed by Aloi and
Lasselle (2007), which stabilizes period 2 cycles, could level the playing field,
by decreasing the persistence of inherited wealth during the transition to the
Romer steady state, if funded by a uniform value-added tax. However, moving
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from period-2 cycles to the Romer steady state with the innovation subsidies
may change the cross-sectional inequality of wealth if the idiosyncratic labor
productivity shocks are correlated.
Section 2 motivates and investigates the impact of changes in inheritance
tax rate in the case of logarithmic preference, while Section 3 motivates and
examines the impact of innovation subsidies, funded by uniform tax, on the
growth and distribution dynamics. The results in this chapter can be extended to
include the case with status anxiety (consumption externality) in the logarithmic
preference, discussed in Chapter 2. Section 4 concludes.
4.2 The impact of inheritance tax
4.2.1 Motivation for exploring changes in inheritance tax rate
As highlighted by Piketty (2014, pp. 503, Figure 14.2), during the last century,
there are significant changes in the top marginal tax rate of the inheritance tax;
particularly for the United States and the United Kingdom, from the onset of the
70’s, these top marginal tax rates have fallen significantly, from more than 70%
to 40% or less. In this section, while I am cognizant of the possible endogeneity
of inheritance tax rate and income distribution, I shall abstract the political econ-
omy aspect from the following analysis. I refer interested readers to the papers
by Benabou (2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) for related theoretical
treatment, and Banerjee and Duflo (2003) for empirical literature. I adopt the
same approach as Bossmann et al. (2007), Wan and Zhu (2012) and Zhu (2013a)
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by looking at the comparative statics of an exogenous change in the inheritance
tax rate, but applied to a different production function, hence extending the ap-
plicability of their results to endogenous growth models with innovation, and
different growth regimes, including periodic cycles.
4.2.2 Impact of exogenous changes in inheritance tax rate
The government’s budget constraint
Suppose the government now levies an inheritance tax at a flat rate τb on all
inheritance, to fund lumpsum transfers to the young, as a new redistributive pol-
icy. All young agents receives the same lumpsum subsidy, gt . The government




bit di = τbbt . (4.1)
Agent’s optimization







t +gt ≡ yit , (4.2)
where bit is now interpreted as the after-tax bequest. Parents, mindful of the












Substituting the new budget constraints into the household optimization as shown
in Appendix C.1, we get the optimal choice of bequest left by an old agent to





Note that in this model with logarithmic utility and "joy-of-giving", taxing
bequests with transfers does not affect the aggregate capital stock, as individ-
uals save a constant fraction out of their own disposable income when young,
and consume a constant fraction out of their own disposable income when old,










Applying the market clearing conditions and working through as in previous





























From the balanced budget of the government (4.1), capital share (1.27) at equi-
librium, capital market clearing (1.30), and the bequest and savings of the aver-
age agent, (4.5) and(1.8) respectively, we get:



























































[lit − lt ]. (4.10)
The ratio of bequest to total output inherited by a young agent from lineage i at
any time t, is a first order non-homogenous difference equation.





























. Substituting (4.11) into equation (4.10),
we get a first order homogenous difference equation for zτbit+1 . That is,
zτbit+1−φ τb1 zτbit = [lit − lt ]≡ uit+1 ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ2l ). (4.12)
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Proposition 4.1. Since
∣∣φ τb1 ∣∣≡ ∣∣∣∣ (1− 1σ )βµΩ1Ω3[1+β (1+µ)](1+τb)
∣∣∣∣< 1, zτbit+1 is a covariance-
stationary AR(1) process.
(i) The expected after-tax bequest inherited by a young agent of lineage i, as



















(ii) The variance of after-tax bequest inherited by a young agent of lineage i,



















(iii) The intergenerational mobility can be measured by the covariance or the
correlation coefficient, to gauge the extent of intergenerational transmis-

















































Proposition 4.2. For an economy with i.i.d. productivity shocks, the higher the
inheritance tax, the lower the correlation of intergenerational bequest in the
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same dynasty, the higher the intergenerational mobility;
furthermore, the cross sectional inequality of after-tax inherited wealth plus
government transfer is lower the higher the inheritance tax.












With no population growth, at the fixed points, the average capital stock for
each time period must be equals to the expected wealth holdings of a family of
lineage i for each time period. From equations (C.12), (C.14), (4.5) and (4.1),
the expected after-tax bequest plus government transfers for an agent of lineage





















]2 ≤ 0. (4.19)

This extends Bossmann et al. (2007) findings that redistribution via estate
taxes can reduce intragenerational after-tax wealth inequality with transfers, and
increases intergenerational mobility beyond the neoclassical framework to cover
endogenous growth with Solow, Romer, or Period-2 growth regimes. Further-
more, with finite variance of labor productivity draws, I can utilise the time
series properties to explore the intergenerational mobility, via the covariance or
correlations, that is absent in Wan and Zhu (2012).
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As noted by Bossmann et al. (2007), this result depends on the assumption
of the utility functions. With logarithmic preferences and "warm-glow" bequest
motive used in this Chapter and by Bossmann et al. (2007) and Wan and Zhu
(2012) in their discussion of estate taxes, the inheritance taxes do not affect the
aggregate macroeconomic variables as the aggregate savings, hence aggregate
wealth, remains unchanged. Thus, this result does not apply to CES utility func-
tions when the constant elasticity of substitution is > 1, as in García-Peñalosa
and Turnovsky (2007) or García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2011), or Appendix
B.1. of Bossmann et al. (2007). Similarly, this result does not apply when sav-
ings decisions are optimized on the combined family income across two or more
generations (e.g. Becker and Tomes (1979) and Davies and Kuhn (1991)), or on
life-cycle income with mortality influence (e.g. Atkinson (1980)).
4.2.3 Impact of inheritance tax rate in the presence of corre-
lated productivity shocks
Let lit = lt +ν(lit−1− lt−1)+ ε it , as in Chapter 1 and Bossmann et al. (2007).
Lineage bequest evolution with correlated shocks at Solow or Romer steady
states













(−φ τb1 ν) bit−1Yt−1 − δ4Ω5 (1−ν)

















































Proposition 4.3. For an economy with mean reverting correlated productivity
shocks, at either Solow or Romer steady states, the higher the inheritance tax,
the lower the correlation of intergenerational bequest in the same dynasty, the
higher the intergenerational mobility;
furthermore, the cross sectional inequality of after-tax inherited wealth plus
















































Lineage bequest evolution with correlated shocks for period-2 cycles































































(1−ν4)(1−ν2φ τb21 )(1−φ τb41 )
]
× [1+φ τb21 +ν(2φ∗1 +φ τb31 )+ν2(1+2φ τb21 +φ∗41 ) . . .
+ν3(φ τb1 +2φ
τb3
1 −φ τb51 )+ν4(φ τb21 +φ τb41 )+ν5(−φ τb31 )]. (4.26)
Proposition 4.4. For an economy with mean reverting correlated productivity
shocks, over period-2 cycles, the cross sectional inequality of after-tax inherited






























However, with correlated shocks and period-2 cycles, the impact of taxes on
lineage mobility is less clear. From equations (A.34) and (A.39) in Chapter 1,
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1 ) . . .
+ν3(φ τb1 +2φ
τb3
1 −φ τb51 )+ν4(φ τb21 +φ τb41 )+ν5(−φ τb31 ). (4.29)






γ(0)∂γ(1)∂φ τb1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−γ(1)∂γ(0)















In summary, with logarithmic preference and "joy of giving", redistribution
via estate taxes reduces cross-sectional inequality in the presence of both i.i.d.
and mean-reverting correlated productivity shocks, for both Solow and Romer
steady states and period-2 growth cycles. Under neoclassical framework, Wan
and Zhu (2012) show this result for the case of i.i.d. shocks, while Bossmann
et al. (2007) derive the result for both i.i.d. shocks and mean-reverting correlated
shocks. In addition, redistribution via estate taxes can also increase intergener-
ational mobility under i.i.d. shocks for both Solow and Romer steady states
and period-2 growth cycles, hence extending the coverage of the mobility result
149
from Bossmann et al. (2007). Wan and Zhu (2012) do not discuss intergenera-
tionl lineage mobility as they relax the finite variance assumption of the labor
productivity shocks, which consequently restricts their results to cross-sectional
intra-generational inequality comparisons.
4.3 The impact of innovation subsidies
4.3.1 Motivation for exploring changes in innovation subsi-
dies
Data sourced from OECD (2011, pp. 29, Figure 3)1 and National Science Foun-
dation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (2013, Table 2,
in 2005 constant USD)2 suggest a trend-growth in Research and Development
expenditure from both the public and private sectors. The empirics are comple-
mented by theoretical developments of R&D-based growth models in the last 2
decades, led by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). In these mod-
els, innovations incur a fixed cost. To promote growth and reduce aggregate
economic fluctuations arising from cycles, the role of innovation subsidies in
Matsuyama (1999) has been studied by Aloi and Lasselle (2007) and Li and
Zhang (2014). Aloi and Lasselle (2007) explore a lump-sum fixed cost subsi-
dies with lumpsum tax on the young, without bequest or envy motive, by relax-
1OECD (2011).
Retrieved from: http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/49499779.pdf, on November 9, 2014.
2National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics
(2013).
Retrieved from: http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf14304/, on July 1, 2014.
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ing current period capital constraint3. On the other hand, Li and Zhang (2014)
consider a proportional innovation cost and intermediate goods’ price subsidies
with consumption tax, without bequest or envy motive, while maintaining the
current period capital constraint, respecting the "time to build" spirit. In this
chapter, I consider imposing a lump-sum fixed cost subsidies, with relaxation of
the current period capital constraint as in Aloi and Lasselle (2007), but with the
added bequest motive to study how innovation subsidies can have distributional
effects. The advantage of this approach is the existence of an exit strategy with
the subsidies as the economy approaches the Romer steady state. However, un-
like Li and Zhang (2014), this approach has a disadvantage as it does not address
the static inefficiency of the monopoly pricing of newly innovated intermediate
goods. To avoid other distortionary distributional effect, I shall fund this inno-
vation subsidy by a uniform output or value added tax, instead of a lump-sum
tax on the young as in Aloi and Lasselle (2007). This helps to isolate effect of
fiscal policy from bequest and envy (for extensions of Chapter 2) motives, and
to maintain tractability for distribution analysis across regimes.
3By relaxing the capital constraint on innovation using the current tax revenue directly in
Aloi and Lasselle (2007), effectively, it leads to a qualified recovery of the Romer (1990) model,
where the final goods are used for intermediate production and innovation, resulting in no tran-
sitional dynamics and cycles. This is a deviation from Matsuyama (1999), where accumulated
capital instead of final goods is used for the production of intermediate goods and innovation,
providing the channel for growth through cycles.
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4.3.2 Impact of innovation subsidies
Agent’s optimization
Suppose the government now levies a uniform tax at a flat rate τt on both labor
income and capital income (akin to a value-added tax instead of a lumpsum
tax on young as in Aloi and Lasselle (2007)), to promote innovations under an
otherwise Solow regime over period-2 cycles. The first period budget constraint





t +(1− τt)wit ≡ yit . (4.32)
The second period budget constraint changes to:
(1− τt+1)Rt+1sit = dit+1+bit+1. (4.33)
Substituting the new budget constraints into the household optimization, and



















Production with fixed cost subsidies as suggested by Aloi and Lasselle (2007)
The production sector is based on Matsuyama (1999). The production function










where Aˆ is the total factor productivity; xt(z) denotes the intermediate input of
variety z in period t; σ ∈ (1,∞) is the direct partial elasticity of substitution
between each pair of intermediate goods; and [0,Nt ] is the range of intermediate
available at period t. Since the final goods sector is perfectly competitive, we



























From equations (4.39) and (4.40), the relative demand for "old" and "new" in-














Innovation of new intermediates is driven by the existence of 1-period monopoly
profits, specifically:
pit = pmt x
m
t −Rt(axmt +F +Tt−1), (4.43)
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where Tt−1 < 0 is a lumpsum innovation subsidy set by the government at the
end of period t−1. With one-period monopoly power and free entry, the demand





















The resource constraint on capital in period t is:
Kt−1 = Nt−1axct +(Nt−Nt−1)(axmt +F +Tt−1). (4.46)
From the relative prices of intermediate inputs (4.42), demand for the inter-
mediates (4.44) and (4.45), and the resource constraint on capital (4.46), work-
















, θ ∈ [1,e], e = 2.71828... , and θ is increas-
ing with σ . The critical point for profitable innovation is kcr ≡ 1+ Tt−1F .





















σ Kt−1 if kt−1 ≤ 1+ Tt−1F ≡ kcr
A˜t−1Kt−1 if kt−1 ≥ kcr
(4.49)







]− 1σ and kcr ≡ 1+ Tt−1F .
154
The government’s budget constraint
I assume that the policy makers follow the simple stabilization principle as sug-
gested by Aloi and Lasselle (2007):
Tt−1 = κ(k∗∗− kt−1) if kt−1 ≤ k∗∗, (4.50)
where κ ≤ 0, whose magnitude represents the size of government intervention,
and k∗∗ represents the Romer steady state. This intervention will promote the
innovation of new intermediate products, to bring the aggregate economy to-
wards the Romer steady state in the long-run. The government runs a balanced
budget at all times, with:
τtYt ≡ τt (Lwt +RtKt−1) =−(Nt−Nt−1)Tt−1. (4.51)
General equilibrium
From aggregate savings equation by integrating individual agent’s savings (4.36),
budget balanced (4.51), together with market clearing conditions - (1.24), (1.25),
(1.26) and (1.27) :
St = Kt =Ω1Ω3Yt−Ω1Ω3τtYt
=Ω1Ω3Yt−Ω1Ω3[−(Nt−Nt−1)Tt−1], (4.52)
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where Ω1 ≡ β (1+µ)1+β (1+µ) and Ω3 ≡ 1+σµσ(1+µ) . Substituting (4.47) and (4.49) into































σ Kt−1 if kt−1 ≤ 1+ Tt−1F ≡ kcr
Ω1Ω3A˜t−1Kt−1 if kt−1 ≥ kcr,
(4.54)







]− 1σ and kcr ≡ 1+ Tt−1F . Dividing both sides
by θσFNt , the aggregate dynamics of the system can be characterized by the





























 if kt−1 ≥ kcr,
(4.55)
where G≡Ω1Ω3A, Ω1 ≡ β (1+µ)1+β (1+µ) , Ω3 ≡ 1+σµσ(1+µ) , and A≡ Aˆa ( aLθσF )
1
σ .
From agent’s optimal bequest (4.34), budget balanced (4.51), together with
market clearing conditions - (1.24), (1.25), (1.26) and (1.27), the law of motion
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[lit − lt ]. (4.58)
Proposition 4.5. From period-2 cycles without innovation subsidies, by shifting
to the Romer steady state, using the policy rule (4.50):
(i) lineage mobility is unchanged when comparing the Romer steady state to
the onset, as the mobility only increases during transition;
(ii) inequality of inherited wealth is unchanged if shocks are i.i.d., but if shocks
are correlated, cross-sectional inequality of the ratio of bequests to total
output under period-2 cycles is greater (less) that under steady states if the




4See Aloi and Lasselle (2007) for a discussion on the aggregate welfare treatment. Here,
the transitional impact on mobility and distributional impact on cross-sectional inequality are
highlighted.
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Proof. First, by inspecting the AR(1) coefficient of (4.58), the lineage mobility
when transitioning to the Romer steady state is higher if the innovation subsidy
is funded by a uniform output tax. Second, from chapter 1, Propositions 1.10
and 1.21, a cross-sectional wealth inequality comparison can be made, in the
presence of innovation subsidy policy (4.50) that stablizes period-2 cycles by
moving the economy towards the Romer steady state. 
In summary, pro-growth stabilization and welfare innovation subsidies as
suggested by Aloi and Lasselle (2007) do not have long-run impact on mobility
or inequality if the labor productivity shocks are i.i.d. in nature. In this chapter,
by funding this fixed cost innovation subsidies with a value-added tax (instead
of a lumpsum tax on young as in Aloi and Lasselle (2007)) , this policy has an
added advantage of enhancing the lineage mobility by reducing the persistence
(autocorrelation coefficient) of the law of motion of bequest during the transition
to the Romer steady state. However, if the labor productivity shocks are corre-
lated, there is a long-run impact on cross-sectional inequality as the economy
moves from a period-2 cycle to the Romer steady state, and the impact depends
on the relative magnitude of the propagation via the autoregressive coefficient
of the law of motion of bequest and the magnitude of the labor productivity
correlation.
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4.4 Conclusion - impact of fiscal policies on mobil-
ity and inequality
In this chapter, an increase in inheritance tax decreases cross-sectional inequal-
ity, under i.i.d. and correlated shocks for both growth regimes and period-2
cycles, strengthening the results from Bossmann et al. (2007). Furthermore,
an increase in inheritance tax also increases intergenerational lineage mobility
under i.i.d. shocks. In addition, the use of innovation subsidy policy rule pro-
posed by Aloi and Lasselle (2007), which stabilizes period 2 cycles, could level
the playing field, by decreasing the persistence of inherited wealth during the
transition to the Romer steady state, if funded by a uniform value-added tax.
However, when stabilising the peiod-2 cycles with innovation subsidy, there can
be a long-run impact on the cross-sectional wealth inequality if the labor pro-
ductivity shocks are correlated.
It is also clear we need a combination of fiscal policies to meet the multi-
dimensional goals of growth, mobility and inequality, and consumption exter-
nality. The potential tradeoffs between mobility, cross sectional inequality and
growth are highlighted by this OLG model. Mobility-inequality tradeoffs are
often hidden in infinitely lived or 2-way altruistic models, where policies that
improve cross-sectional inequality distributions tend to imply that all agents in
the economy will benefit. When agents have a finite life, the timing, duration,
and nature of fiscal policy matters.
Finally, one should also bear in mind the political economy aspects of fiscal
159
policies. There exist distinct differences in the normative recommendations de-
pending on one’s philosophical stance, as illustrated by the following two quotes
from Rawls (2009) and Hayek (1976) respectively:
"...no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor
does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence and strength, and the like." Rawls (2009, pp. 118);
"For in such a system in which each is allowed to use his knowledge for
his own purposes the concept of ’social justice’ is necessarily empty and mean-
ingless, because in it nobody’s will can determine the relative incomes of the
different people, or prevent that they be partly dependent on accident. ’Social
justice’ can be given a meaning only in a directed or ’command’ economy (such
as an army) in which the individuals are ordered what to do; and any particular
conception of ’social justice’ could be realized only in such a centrally directed
system. It presupposes that people are guided by specific directions and not by
rules of just individual conduct. Indeed, no system of rules of just individual
conduct, and therefore no free action of the individuals, could produce results
satisfying any principle of distributive justice." Hayek (1976, pp. 330).
160
Appendix A
Proofs of chapter 1
A.1 Solutions to agents’ optimization












)≡ lncit +β [lndit+1+µ lnbit+1] (A.1)






t ≡ yit ,





At time t+1, an old agent maximizes his second period utility, defined as:
V ≡ lndit+1+µ lnbit+1, (A.2)
by choosing his second period consumption and bequest for his immediate off-
spring, given his second period budget constraint. The second period budget






where Rt+1 is the equilibrium gross rate of return on capital at time t +1. Sub-
stituting (A.3) into (A.2), and differentiating the latter with respect to dit+1 for
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At time t, subject to the first period budget constraint, the young agent chooses













t ≡ yit , (A.8)
where wit = wt l
i
t ; wt is the equilibrium wage rate for each unit of labor produc-
tivity; sit is the amount saved when young; and y
i
t is the lifetime resource of an
individual i for agent i, born at time t. Substituting (A.8) and (A.6) into (A.7),
and differentiating the latter with respect to sit for the first order condition:
1














































yt ≡ Rt+1Ω2yt . (A.18)
A.2 Derivation of law of motion for period-2 cycle
with correlated shocks
Let lit = lt + ν(lit−1− lt−1) + ε it , as with Davies and Kuhn (1991), Bossmann
et al. (2007) and Wan and Zhu (2012), where lt1 = lt−1 = 1, 0 < v < 1,and ε it ∼
i.i.d. (0,σ2l ). (
lit − lt
)
































)−ν2(lit−2− lt−2) = νε it−1, (A.22)(
lit − lt
)−ν(lit−1− lt−1)+ν (lit−1− lt−1)−ν2(lit−2− lt−2) = ε it +νε it−1.
(A.23)





























































By iterative substitution, we get an ARMA(4,2) process for each of the fixed

















































































1−φ cm2 −φ cm4
)
. Lineage dynamics of
period-2 cycles with mean reverting productivity shocks from (A.26) can be
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expressed as follows:













where φ cm2 =
(
φ∗21 +ν
















If the economy is at Romer regime at time t+1 and t−1, and Solow regime
at time t and t − 2, for each of the fixed point, the asymptotic cross-sectional
distribution can be derived from the lineage bequest evolution.
A.3 Addendum to proof of proposition 1.20
With covariance-stationarity, we can compute the covariances and correlations
of the lineage bequest evolution. To simplify notation, superscripts are dropped,
and the time index on the moving average innovations are rescaled, by defining
uit ≡ ε it−1.
zt = φ2zt−2+φ4zt−4+ut +θ1ut−1+θ2ut−2. (A.28)




















γ(1) = φ2γ(1)+φ4γ(3)+0+θ1σ2l +θ1θ2σ
2
l . (A.30)






γ(2) = φ2γ(0)+φ4γ(2)+0+0+θ2σ2l . (A.31)
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γ(3) = φ2γ(1)+φ4γ(1)+0+0+0. (A.32)






γ(4) = φ2γ(2)+φ4γ(0)+0+0+0. (A.33)
Substituting γ(3) from (A.32) into γ(1) from (A.30), we get:






































































































× [1+φ∗21 +ν(2φ∗1 +φ∗31 )+ν2(1+2φ∗21 +φ∗41 )
+ν3(φ∗1 +2φ
∗3
1 −φ∗51 )+ν4(φ∗21 +φ∗41 )+ν5(−φ∗31 )]. (A.39)
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γ(k) = E[zt−kzt ] = φ2E[zt−kzt−2]+φ4E[zt−kzt−4]+E[zt−kut ]




2)γ(k−2)+(−φ∗21 ν2)γ(k−4) ∀k≥ 3.
(A.40)
From the covariances, we can obtain the autocorrelations, hence the lineage





Proofs of chapter 2
B.1 Solutions to agents’ optimization
As proved in Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2012). The optimization behavior
of the average agent, as well as agent of lineage i, are restated here, with some
changes to accommodate the continuum of agents of measure 1, for complete-
ness.
At time t+1, an old agent maximizes his second period utility, defined as:
V ≡ ln(dit+1−ξγdt+1)+µ ln(bit+1), (B.1)
by choosing his second period consumption and bequest for his immediate off-
spring, given his second period budget constraint. The second period budget






where Rt+1 is the equilibrium gross rate of return on capital at time t+1.
Substituting (B.2) into (B.1), and differentiating the latter with respect to
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At time t, subject to the first period budget constraint, the young agent













t ≡ yit , (B.7)
where wit = wt l
i
t ; wt is the equilibrium wage rate for each unit of labor produc-
tivity; sit is the amount saved when young; and y
i
t is the lifetime resource of an
individual i for agent i, born at time t.
Substituting (B.7) into (B.6), and differentiating the latter with respect to cit
























B.1.1 Optimal behavior of the average agent







wit di = bt +wt . (B.11)
From the second period budget constraint (B.2), and the optimal choices of an








Substituting the optimal savings of a young agent i into the first order condition







β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]st . (B.14)
To obtain the optimal choices of the average agent as a function of his life-
time resources, we use the second period budget constraint (B.2), and the opti-




(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]yt ≡Ω1yt ; (B.15)
ct =
(1−ξγ)




(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]yt ; (B.17)
bt+1 =
Rt+1βµ(1− γ)(1−ξγ)
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]yt ≡ Rt+1Ω2yt . (B.18)
B.1.2 Optimal behavior of an agent from lineage i
With the optimal choices of the average agent as the reference, using (B.10), for
the i−th agent of the same generation,




(1−ξγ) βct . (B.19)
















































(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] ; (B.26)
φd =
ξγµ (1− γ)β +ξγ(1− γ)− (1−ξγ)γ
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] ; (B.27)
φb =
(1−ξγ)γ+ξγ (1− γ)β
(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] . (B.28)
B.2 Addendum to proof of propositions 2.1 & 2.2
Since
Ω˜1 ≡ β [1+µ(1−ξγ)](1− γ)







(1− γ)[1+µ(1−ξγ)][ξ +βξ (1− γ)µ+β [1+µ(1−ξγ)]









LHS≡ (1− γ)[1+µ(1−ξγ)][ξ +βξ (1− γ)µ+β [1+µ(1−ξγ)] (B.30)




RHS−LHS = 1+µ+ξ 2γ2µ−ξ −2ξγµ
= 1+µ(1+ξ 2γ2−2ξγ)−ξ





















[1+µ(1−ξγ)][γ+β (1− γ)µγ]− γµ {(1−ξγ)+(1− γ)β [1+µ(1−ξγ)}
= γ+β (1− γ)γµ+ γµ(1−ξγ)+β (1− γ)(1−ξγ)γµ2 . . .
−γµ+ γ2µξ −β (1− γ)γµ−β (1− γ)(1−ξγ)γµ2
























σ [1+µ(1−ξγ)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0










σ [1+µ(1−ξγ)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≤ 0 since σ ≥ 1. (B.36)
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Appendix C
Proofs of chapter 4
C.1 Solutions to agents’ optimization with inheri-
tance tax
The government’s budget constraint
Suppose the government now levies an inheritance tax at a flat rate τb on all
inheritance, to fund lumpsum transfers to the young, as a new redistributive pol-
icy. All young agents receives the same lumpsum subsidy, gt . The government




bit di = τbbt . (C.1)
Agent’s optimization












)≡ lncit +β [lndit+1+µ lnbit+1] (C.2)






t +gt ≡ yit ,






At time t+1, an old agent maximizes his second period utility, defined as:
V ≡ lndit+1+µ lnbit+1, (C.3)
by choosing his second period consumption and bequest for his immediate off-
spring, given his second period budget constraint. The second period budget






where Rt+1 is the equilibrium gross rate of return on capital at time t +1. Sub-
stituting (C.4) into (C.3), and differentiating the latter with respect to bit+1 for






















At time t, subject to the first period budget constraint, the young agent chooses













t +gt ≡ yit , (C.9)
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where wit =wt l
i
t ; wt is the equilibrium wage rate for each unit of labor productiv-
ity; sit is the amount saved when young; gt is the flat amount of redistributed tax
from the government; and yit is the lifetime resource of an individual i for agent
i, born at time t. Substituting (C.9) and (C.7) into (C.8), and differentiating the
latter with respect to sit for the first order condition:
1













































yt ≡ Rt+1Ω2yt . (C.19)
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